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Abstract
This study explores the consequences and origins of between-ethnicity economic inequality
both across and within countries. First, combining satellite images of nighttime luminosity
with the historical homelands of ethnolinguistic groups we construct measures of ethnic in-
equality for a large sample of countries and show that the latter is strongly inversely related to
comparative development. Second, differences in geographic endowments across ethnic home-
lands explain a sizable portion of ethnic inequality contributing to its persistence over time.
Third, exploiting across-district within-African countries variation using individual-level data
on ethnic identification and well-being from the Afrobarometer Surveys we find that between-
ethnic-group inequality is systematically linked to regional under-development. In this sample
we also explore the channels linking ethnic inequality to (under) development, finding that
ethnic inequality maps to political inequality, heightened perceptions of discrimination and
undersupply of public goods.
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1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity has costs and benefits. On the one hand, diversity in skills, education, and en-
dowments can enhance productivity by promoting trade and innovation, especially in advanced
economies. On the other hand, ethnic diversity is often associated with poor policies, low public
goods provision, conflict, and hatred. In fact a large literature shows a negative effect of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation on various aspects of economic performance, with the possible exception
of wealthy economies (see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review). Income inequality may also
have both positive and negative effects on development. On the negative side, a higher degree of
income inequality may lead to conflict, crime, prevent the poor from acquiring education and/or
lead to expropriation and lofty taxation discouraging investment. On the positive side, however,
income inequality may spur innovation and entrepreneurship by motivating individuals. Further
complicating the relationship between the two, a positive correlation between inequality and de-
velopment may simply reflect Simon Kuznetz’s conjecture that industrialization translates into
higher levels of inequality at the early stage of development; while at later stages the association
becomes negative. Given the theoretical ambiguities (and data issues) perhaps it comes at no
surprise that it has been very hard to detect empirically a robust association between inequality
and development (see Benabou (2005) and Galor (2011) for surveys).
This paper puts forward and tests an alternative conjecture that focuses on the inter-section
of ethnic diversity and inequality. Our thesis is that what mostly matters for development are
economic differences between ethnic groups coexisting in the same country, rather than the de-
gree of fractionalization per se or income inequality conventionally measured (i.e., independent of
ethnicity). Inequality in income along ethnic lines is likely to lead to political inequality, increase
animosity, and lead to discriminatory policies of one (or more) groups against the others. Fur-
thermore, differences in preferences across both ethnic and income lines may lead to inadequate
public goods provision, as groups’ ideal allocation of public goods will be quite distant. More-
over, the presence of an economically dominant ethnic minority may lower support for democracy
and free-market institutions, as the majority of the population usually feels that the benefits of
capitalism go to just a handful of ethnic groups. Ethnic inequality often implies that well-being
depends on group affiliation; hence it is more likely to generate envy and perceptions that the
system is "unfair", more so than the conventionally measured economic inequality, since the latter
can be more easily be thought of as the result of ability or effort.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide measures of within-country differences in
well-being across ethnic groups, coined as "ethnic inequality". Information on income levels of
ethnic groups for all countries is not available. Hence, to construct country-level indicators of eth-
nic inequality for the largest possible sample, we combine maps on the location of ethnolinguistic
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groups with satellite images of light density at night, which are strong proxies of development
and are available at a fine grid (see Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012)). The cross-ethnic
group inequality index is weakly correlated with the commonly employed -and notoriously poorly
measured- income inequality measures at the country level. To isolate the cross-ethnic compo-
nent of inequality from the overall inequality across regions, we also construct proxies of spatial
inequality.
Second, we document a strong negative association between ethnic inequality and real
GDP per capita at the country level. This correlation holds even when we condition on the
overall degree of spatial inequality, which is also inversely related to well-being (an novel finding
by itself). We also uncover that the negative correlation between ethnolinguistic fragmentation
and development weakens considerably when we account for ethnic inequality; this suggests that
it is the unequal concentration of wealth across ethnic lines that is detrimental for development
rather than diversity per se.
Third, in an effort to shed light on the roots of ethnic inequality we construct measures
reflecting differences in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands and show that the latter
is a strong predictor of ethnic inequality. In contrast there is no link between contemporary ethnic
inequality and historical variables capturing the type of colonization, state formation, legal origin,
etc. Fourth, we show that contemporary development at the country level is also inversely related
to inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands.
Fifth, we examine the link between ethnic inequality and development using individual-level
data from the Afrobarometer surveys, exploiting within-country across-district variation. Besides
the immediate econometric benefits of looking within -rather than across countries- (effectively
accounting for country-level fixed factors related to national institutions and policies, historical
legacies, etc), this is quite useful for validating the cross-country results (based on luminosity
and ethnographic maps) using detailed micro-level data. Specifically, we construct measures
capturing between-group and within-group inequality utilizing information from roughly 20, 000
respondents in 16 Sub-Saharan countries on ethnic identification and well-being. Our analysis
shows that -conditional on numerous individual characteristics- respondents residing in ethnically
unequal districts are less educated and have lower standards of living. This pattern also holds
when we exploit within-ethnicity variation (this is feasible as we observe respondents from the
same ethnicity residing in multiple districts), effectively accounting for both unobserved ethnic
features and migration.
Sixth, we exploit the richness of the Afrobarometer data to make some progress towards
understanding the mechanisms linking ethnic inequality to (lack of) development in the most
unequal and fragmented part of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa. We begin our analysis on the
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channels showing that ethnic inequality goes in tandem with political inequality and discrimina-
tion across ethnic lines. We then examine the link between ethnic inequality and public goods
provision building on the large literature in political economy showing that in ethnically diverse
countries (as well as regions and cities within the United States and some other countries) there
is under-provision of public goods. Our analysis shows that even when one looks within the same
country access to basic public goods, such as piped water, a sewage system, and electrification
is systematically lower in districts characterized by high levels of ethnic inequality. While this
association does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship, it pertains even when controlling
for numerous individual characteristics (including proxies of wealth and well-being) and ethnicity
fixed effects. Finally, we examine the link between ethnic inequality and individual beliefs on the
merits of democracy. This investigation is motivated by the influential thesis of Chua (2003),
who argues that the spread of democracy (and free market institutions) since the 1990s does not
necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency, when wealth is concentrated across ethnic lines.
The uncovered evidence is supportive of this conjecture. Respondents found in ethnically un-
equal districts feel unfairly treated by the government and are less satisfied with the functioning
of democratic institutions.
Related Works While both the literature linking ethnolinguistic diversity and economic
performance and the literature studying the interplay between inequality and development are
voluminous, there have been very few works examining the role of ethnic inequality on well-
being. Exploiting data from 29 developing countries (from the Demographic and Health Surveys),
Kyriacou (2013) finds that socioeconomic ethnic group inequalities reduce government quality.
Cederman, Weidman, and Gleditch (2011) combine proxies of local economic activity from the
G-Econ database with ethnolinguistic maps to construct an index of ethnic inequality for a sub-
set of "politically relevant ethnic groups" (as defined by Ethnic Power Relations Dataset) and
then show that in highly unequal countries, both rich and poor groups fight more often than
those groups whose wealth is closer to the country average.
Structure The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the construction
of the ethnic inequality index and present summary statistics. In Section 3 we report the results
of our analysis associating income per capita with ethnic inequality across 173 countries. In
Section 4 we examine the geographic origins of contemporary differences in ethnic inequality
across countries; we also report estimates associating contemporary development with inequality
in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. In Section 5 we first examine the within-
country across-district association between ethnic inequality and well-being in 16 Sub-Saharan
countries using individual-level data from the Afrobarometer Surveys. We then use these data to
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explore the channels linking ethnic inequality to development. In the last section we summarize
and discuss potential avenues for future research.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Since data on income-wages at the ethnicity level are not readily available for a large number of
countries, to construct proxies of ethnic inequality for a large number of countries we combine
information from ethnographic maps on the location of ethnic-linguistic groups with satellite
images on light density at night that are available at a fine grid and can thus be aggregated at
the historical ethnic homeland level. In this Section we discuss the construction of the cross-
country measures capturing inequality in development (as reflected in luminosity) across ethnic
homelands and across regions within 173 countries.
2.1 Location of ethnic groups
We identify the location of ethnic groups employing two data sets/maps. First we use the Geo-
Referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG), which is the digitized version of the Soviet Atlas Narodov
Mira (Weidmann, Rod, and Cederman (2010)). GREG portrays the homelands of 1, 276 ethnic
groups around the world. The information pertains to the early 1960’s so for many countries,
in Africa in particular, it corresponds to the time of independence.1 The GIS data set uses the
political boundaries of 1964 to allocate groups to different countries. We thus project the ethnic
homelands to the political boundaries of the 2000 Digital Chart of the World (ignoring polygons
of less than 1 km2); this results in 2, 125 ethnic homelands within contemporary countries. Most
areas (1, 630) are coded as pertaining to a single group whereas in the remaining 495 there can be
up to three groups. For example, in Northeast India along an area of 4, 380 km2 the Assamese,
the Oriyas and the Santals overlap. In these cases we assign the respective homeland to all
groups. The size of ethnic homelands varies considerably. The smallest polygon occupies an area
of 1.15 km2 (French in Monaco) and the largest extends over 7, 335, 476 km2 (American English
in the US). The median (mean) group size is 4, 198 (61, 506) km2. The median (mean) country
has 8 (11.52) ethnicities with the most diverse being Indonesia with 94 groups.
Our second source is the 15th edition of Ethnologue (Gordon (2005)) that maps 7, 570
linguistic groups (using the political boundaries of 2000 for the geo-referencing). In spite of the
detailed linguistic mapping, Ethnologue’s coverage for some continents (e.g., Latin America) is
limited while for others (i.e. Africa and Asia) is very detailed. Ethnologue’s mapping corresponds
to the early 1990’s; thus the location of ethnic groups may be affected by national policies, conflict,
1The original Atlas Narodov Mira consists of 57 ethnographic maps. The original sources are: (1) ethnographic
and geographic maps assembled by the Institute of Ethnography at the USSR Academy of Sciences, (2) population
census data, and (3) ethnographic publications of government agencies.
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or other features. Each polygon in the Ethnologue delineates a traditional linguistic region;
populations away from their homelands (in cities, refugee camps) are not mapped. Groups of
unknown location, widespread and extinct languages are not mapped, the only exception is the
English in the United States. Ethnologue also records areas where languages overlap; in this case
we assign the polygon to all languages. Ethnologue provides a more refined linguistic aggregation
compared to the GREG. As a result the median (mean) homeland extends to 728 (12, 986) km2.
The smallest language is the Domari in Israel which covers 1.18 km2 with the largest group is
the English in the US covering 9, 327, 331 km2. The median (mean) country has 9 (41.9) groups
with Papua New Guinea being the most diverse country with 791 linguistic groups.
GREG attempts to map major immigrant groups whereas Ethnologue generally does not.
This is important for countries in the New World. For example, in Argentina GREG reports
16 groups, among them Germans, Italians, and Chileans, whereas Ethnologue reports 20 purely
indigenous groups, such as the Toba and the Quechua. For Canada Ethnologue lists 77 mostly
indigenous groups, like the Blackfoot and the Chipewyan with only English and French being his-
torically non-indigenous; in contrast GREG that lists 23 groups is featuring many non-indigenous
groups, such as Swedes, Russians, Norwegians and Germans. Hence, the two ethnolinguistic map-
pings capture different cleavages, at least in some continents.2
2.2 Luminosity
Since comparable data on income per capita at the ethnicity level across all countries in the
world do not exist, following Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) and subsequent studies
(e.g., (Chen and Nordhaus (2011), Pinkovskiy (2011), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012,
2013)) we use satellite image data on light density at night as a proxy.3 The luminosity data
come from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System that
reports images of the earth at night. The six-bit number that ranges from 0 to 63 is available
approximately at every square kilometer since 1992. To construct luminosity at the desired level
of aggregation we average all observations falling within the boundaries of an ethnic group and
then divide with the population of each area using data from the Gridded Population of the
World that reports geo-referenced pixel-level population estimates for 1990 and 2000.4
2We are including all groups in our analysis without attempting to make a distinction as to which cleavage is
more salient.
3These -and other works- show that luminosity is a strong correlate of development at various levels of aggre-
gation (countries, regions, ethnic homelands).
4The data is constructed using subnational census and other surveys of population at various levels (city,
neighborhood, region). See for details: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v
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2.3 Ethnic Inequality
We proxy the level development in ethnic homeland i with average luminosity per capita, yi, and
construct the Gini index that reflects inequality across ethnic groups (ethnic inequality) for each
country. Specifically, the Gini coefficient for a country’s population consisting of n groups with
values of luminosity per capita for the historical homeland of ethnicity i, yi, where i = 1 to n are
indexed in non-decreasing order (yi ≤ yi+1), is calculated as follows:
G =
1
n
(n+ 1− 2
∑n
i=1(n+ 1− i)yi∑n
i=1 yi
)
Note that the ethnic Gini index captures differences in mean income -as captured in lumi-
nosity per capita at the ethnic homeland- across groups. For each of the two different linguistic
maps we construct Gini coefficients for the maximum sample of countries using cross-ethnic-
homeland data in 1992, 2000, and 2009. As a robustness we also construct the Gini coefficient
dropping the capital cities and excluding small ethnicities, defined as those capturing less than
1% of the 2000 population in a country. For example, in Kenya the Atlas Narodov Mira (the
Ethnologue) maps 19 (53) ethnic (linguistic) areas. Yet 7 ethnic (37 linguistic) areas are less than
one percent of the Kenya’s population as of 2000. We thus construct the ethnic Gini index using
all ethnic groups (19 and 53), but also just using the 12 large ethnic and 16 large linguistic areas
in Kenya, respectively.
2.4 Spatial inequality
Since we use ethnic homelands (rather than individual-level) data to measure between-group
inequality, the ethnic inequality measures also reflect regional disparities in income (that may
not be related to ethnic diversity). To isolate the between-ethnicity component from regional
inequality, we thus also construct Gini coefficients reflecting the overall (rather than the ethnic)
degree of spatial inequality in each country. Since we couldn’t find a widely-accepted way to
measure spatial inequality, we construct for robustness two measures of the overall degree of
spatial inequality in each country.
Spatial Gini Coefficient 1. This index is based on aggregating luminosity per capita
across roughly equally-sized boxes. We first generate a global grid of pixels of 2.5 by 2.5 decimal
degrees (that extends from −180 to 180 degrees longitude and from 85 degrees latitude to −65
degrees latitude). Second, we intersect the resulting global grid with the 2000 Digital Chart of
the World that portrays contemporary national borders; this results in 4, 512 pixels across the
globe falling within country boundaries. The median (mean) pixel extends to 25, 967 (29, 780)
km2, being comparable to the size of ethnic homelands in the GREG dataset, when we exclude
those groups with less than 1 percent of a country’s population (20, 338 km2). Third, for each
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pixel (of 2.5x2.5 decimal degrees) we compute luminosity per capita in 1992, 2000, and 2009.
Fourth, we aggregate the data at the country level estimating a Gini coefficient that captures the
overall degree of economic spatial inequality.
Spatial Gini Coefficient 2 Virtual countries created by the 2.5 by 2.5 degree boxes
are on average somewhat larger than ethnic homelands; moreover, because of the fixed grid
dimensionality, smaller countries end up having fewer boxes. Hence, to capture spatial inequality
at a level of aggregation similar to the one in the data we also constructed an index of spatial
inequality based on Thiessen polygons. The latter have the unique property that each polygon
contains only one input point, and any location within a polygon is closer to its associated point
than to the point of any other polygon. Importantly, we use as input points the centroids of the
linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. Thus, Thiessen polygons have the exact
same centroid as the actual linguistic homelands in the Ethnologue database; the key difference
being that ethnic homelands rather than being symmetric polygons have idiosyncratic shapes.
We then intersect the 7, 570 Thiessen polygons with the country boundaries in 2000 obtaining a
total of 9, 116 grids. We then construct a spatial Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights
per capita across Thiessen polygons.5 The mean size of the Thiessen polygons is 14.809 km, very
similar to the mean size of homelands in the Ethnologue (12, 964 km2).
It is important to realize that both proxies of the overall degree of spatial inequality also
reflect inequality across ethnic homelands, since (i) there is clearly some degree of measurement
error on the exact boundaries of ethnic regions and (ii) because population mixing is in practice
higher than the one we observe in the data. Moreover, in countries with large groups the spatial
Gini coefficients may also (partially) capture within-ethnic-group inequality. We thus (almost)
always include both the ethnic inequality and the overall spatial inequality index in the empirical
specifications.6
2.5 Example
Figures 1a− 1b provide an illustration of the construction of the ethnic inequality measures for
Afghanistan. The Atlas Narodov Mira maps 31 ethnicities (Figure 1a). The Afghan is the largest
group that consists of the Pashtuns and the Pathans residing in the southern and central-southern
regions. This group takes up 51% of the population in 2000. The second largest group is the Tajik,
who compose 22% of the population and are located in the north-eastern regions and in scattered
5To focus on non-trivial grids in terms of size for both the Thiessen polygons and the 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree
boxes we drop those polygons capturing an area of less than 100 square kilometers.
6 In principle one could generate within-group inequality measures using the finer structure of the luminosity
data. However, within-group mobility and risk sharing issues makes a luminosity-based, within-group inequality
index less satisfactory. We perform a proper decomposition of between and within-group inequality in the last
section using micro-level data from Africa. The micro-level data also allows us to account for migration (as quite
often we observe individuals from the same ethnic groups in more than two regions in a country).
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pockets in the western part of the country. There are 8 territories in which groups overlap.
We first estimate for each of the 31 homelands luminosity per capita. For groups appearing in
multiple pockets we derive the weighted average of lights per capita using as weights the fraction
of each pocket’s surface area to the total area of the group in the country. Figure 1b portrays the
distribution of lights per capita. Regional development is low in the center of the country, where
the Hazara-Berberi reside and in the eastern provinces, where the Nuristani, the Pamir Tajiks,
the Pashai, and the Kyrgyz tribes are located. Luminosity is higher in the Pashtun/Pathans
homelands and to some lesser extent in the Tajik regions. Second, using lights per capita across
all homelands we estimate the Gini coefficient in 1992, in 2000, and in 2009. In 2000 the Gini
coefficient estimated from GREG is 0.93 very close to the estimate when we use Ethnologue
that maps 39 groups (0.90). We also estimated the ethnic inequality measures excluding the
ethnic homeland where the capital, Kabul, falls; and we also estimated Gini coefficients of ethnic
inequality excluding groups constituting less than 1% of the country’s population.
Figures 2a− 2b illustrate the construction of the overall spatial inequality indicators (Gini
coefficients) using the two different methods. When we divide the globe into pixels of 2.5 x 2.5
decimal-degree boxes we get 24 areas in Afghanistan (Figure 2a). When we use Thiessen polygons
we get 56 pixels in Afghanistan (Figure 2b). After estimating for each pixel, average luminosity
per capita, we aggregate at the country level calculating the Gini coefficient across these pixels.
The resulting measures, overall spatial inequality Gini index 1 and 2 for Afghanistan equal 0.722
and 0.827, respectively.
2.6 Descriptive Analysis
2.6.1 Ethnic Inequality around the World
Table 1 - Panel A reports summary statistics, while Appendix Table 1, Panels A and B report
the correlation structure of the ethnic Gini coefficients between the two global maps in different
points in time. The correlation of the Gini coefficients across the two alternative mappings is
strong, around 0.75 − 0.80. In the relatively short period where luminosity data are available
(1992−2009), ethnic inequality appears very persistent, as the correlations of the Gini coefficients
over time exceed 0.9. Given the high inertia, in our empirical analysis we will exploit the cross-
country variation. The correlation between ethnic inequality and the overall spatial inequality
indicators is high, but far from perfect; ranging between 0.6− 0.8.
Figures 3a−3d illustrate the global distribution of ethnic and spatial inequality. Africa (and
South Asia) are the most ethnically unequal place(s) in the world. In contrast Western Europe
is the region with the lowest level of ethnic inequality. According to the Atlas Narodov Mira,
the countries with the highest ethnic group inequality are Sudan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia
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(Gini index higher than 0.90). According to the Ethnologue’s more detailed mapping of ethnic
homelands the countries with the highest cross-ethnic-group inequality (where Gini exceeds 0.90)
are: Chad, Sudan, Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zaire,
Cameroon, Laos and Indonesia. The countries with the highest overall spatial inequality in light
density according the measure based on Thiessen polygons (spatial Gini 2 is higher than 0.90)
are Chad, Papua New Guinea, Zaire, Gabon, Congo, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.
Since we are primarily interested in uncovering the explanatory power of ethnic inequality
beyond the overall spatial inequality in most specifications we control for the latter. Figures
3e−3f portray the global distribution of ethnic inequality partialling out the effect of the overall
degree of spatial inequality. In Figures 4a - 4b we plot ethnic inequality against the overall degree
of spatial inequality. A few interesting patterns emerge. On the one hand, Sudan, Afghanistan,
and Mongolia have much higher ethnic inequality as compared to the overall spatial inequality
(which is also very high). In contrast, USA and Canada score low in ethnic inequality as compared
to the overall degree of spatial inequality (which is high). On the other hand, Azerbaijan, Syria,
Albania, Tunisia, Haiti, and Rwanda score quite high in ethnic inequality, while in contrast the
overall degree of spatial inequality is quite low.
2.6.2 Basic Correlations
Ethnic Diversity Appendix Table 1 - Panel C reports the correlation structure between the
various ethnic inequality and spatial inequality measures with the widely-used ethnolinguistic
fragmentation measures. There is a positive correlation between ethnic inequality and linguistic-
ethnic fractionalization (0.38−0.45) (data come from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat,
and Wacziarg (2003))). In contrast, there is no systematic association between ethnic inequal-
ity and religious fractionalization. Figures 5a− 5b provide a graphical illustration (including
continental fixed effects does not change the pattern). The correlation between ethnic inequal-
ity and the segregation measures compiled by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) is also positive
(0.20− 0.45). Ethnic inequality tends to go in tandem with segregation. This is reasonable since
more mixing of groups may lead to a reduction of ethnic-based inequality, which instead is more
likely to persist when groups are geographically separated. We also examine the association be-
tween ethnic inequality and spatial inequality with the ethnic polarization indicators of Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012), failing to detect a systematic
association. These results show that the ethnic inequality measure captures a dimension distinct
from already-proposed aspects of a country’s ethnic composition.
Income Inequality We then examined the association between ethnic inequality and
income inequality, as reflected in the standard Gini coefficient (Appendix Table 1 - Panel D).
9
The income Gini coefficient is taken from Easterly (2007) who using survey and census data
compiled from the WIDER (UN’s World Institute for Development Economics Research) con-
structs adjusted cross-country Gini coefficients for more than a hundred countries over the period
1965 − 2000. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate this association using the GREG and the Ethnologue
mapping of ethnic homelands, respectively. The correlation between ethnic inequality and eco-
nomic inequality is moderate, around 0.25− 0.30. Yet this correlation weakens considerably and
becomes statistically insignificant once we simply condition on continental constants.
3 Ethnic Inequality and Development
In Table 3 we report cross-country LS estimates associating the log of per capita GDP in 2000,
with ethnic inequality (Appendix Table 1 - Panel D reports the unconditional correlation of
ethnic inequality with various proxy measures of economic and institutional development). In
Panel A we use the ethnic inequality measure using the Atlas Narodov Mira database, while in
Panel B we use the measures derived from Ethnologue’s mapping. In all specifications we include
region fixed effects to account for continental differences in the coverage of ethnic groups and the
huge variation in economic development.
The coefficient of the ethnic inequality index in column (1) is negative and highly significant.
Figures 7a−7b illustrate the unconditional association.7 The estimates in columns (2) and (4) also
reveal a negative association between development and the overall degree of spatial inequality,
as reflected on the Gini coefficient based on pixels of 2.5 by 2.5 degrees and the Gini coefficient
based on Thiessen polygons that have the same centroid as ethnic homelands in the Ethnologue.
This suggests that underdevelopment goes in tandem with regional inequalities.8 In columns (3)
and (5) we include both the ethnic inequality index and the spatial Gini coefficients. The ethnic
inequality index continues to enter with a highly significant estimate that falls only slightly in
absolute value. In contrast the coefficient on the overall spatial inequality drops considerably in
all permutations; moreover the estimate becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. This
suggests that the ethnic component of regional inequality is the relatively stronger correlate of
underdevelopment.9
In columns (6)-(9) we add the log number of ethnic/linguistic groups in the empirical model.
7The correlation is somewhat weaker in 2009, 0.60 and 0.51 with the GREG and the Ethnologue maps, respec-
tively; the correlation is somewhat stronger in 1992 (0.67 and 0.60, respectively).
8This -to the best of our knowledge novel- result is interesting by itself and deserves future work in understand-
ing the inter-play between development and regional disparities in income (see Bolton and Roland (1997) for a
theoretical exposition).
9There is clearly some degree of measurement error on the exact boundaries of ethnic homelands, while by
construction there is no error on the spatial inequality measures. Additionally, to the extent that populations
mix, the overall spatial inequality index also captures part of ethnic inequality. Both observations suggest that the
coefficient of ethnic inequality on development is likely to be an underestimate of the true magnitudes.
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In line with previous works, income per capita is significantly lower in countries with many ethnic
(Panel A) and linguistic (Panel B) groups (column (6)); yet the estimates in columns (7)-(9)
clearly show that it is ethnic inequality rather than ethnolinguistic heterogeneity that correlates
with underdevelopment. In columns (10)-(11) we examine whether the significantly negative
association between ethnic inequality and income per capita is driven by an unequal clustering
of population across ethnic homelands; to do so we construct Gini coefficients of population
combining the population estimates in 2000 from the Gridded Population of the World dataset
with the mapping of ethnolinguistic groups. The population Gini index enters with a significantly
negative estimate, implying that under-development is associated with an unequal clustering of
population across ethnic regions. Yet once we include in the specification the ethnic inequality
index and the overall spatial inequality indicators (in (11)), the population Gini coefficient index
turns insignificant. The same applies with the spatial Gini coefficient. In contrast the ethnic
inequality measure retains its economic and statistical significance.
The most conservative estimate on the ethnic inequality index in Panel A (1.08) implies
that a reduction in the ethnic Gini coefficient by 0.25 (approximately one standard deviation,
from the level of Nigeria where the ethnic Gini is 0.76 to the level of Namibia where the ethnic Gini
is 0.50) is associated with a 31% (0.27 log points) increase in per capita GDP. The standardized
beta coefficient of the ethnic inequality index is around 0.20−0.30, quite similar to the works on
the role of institutions on development (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)).
3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Other Aspects of the Ethnic Composition In Table 3 we investigate whether other
dimensions of the distribution of the population across groups, related to fractionalization and
polarization, rather than inequality across ethnic lines affect comparative development. In
columns (1) and (5) we augment the specification with a fractionalization index (from Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003)) whereas in columns (2) and (6) we exper-
iment with Fearon’s (2003) cultural fragmentation index that adjusts the fractionalization index
for linguistic distances among ethnic groups. Doing so has no effect on the coefficient on ethnic
inequality that retains its economic and statistical significance. Moreover, the fractionalization
indicators enter with unstable and statistically insignificant estimates.
Motivated by recent works highlighting the importance of polarization in columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8) we condition on two alternative measures of ethnic polarization (from Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012); the latter adjusts for linguistic
differences across groups). Ethnic inequality correlates strongly with development, while the po-
larization measures enter with insignificant estimates. We also estimated specifications including
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both the polarization and the fractionalization indicators; in all perturbations the coefficient on
ethnic inequality retains its statistical and economic significance.
Alternative Measures and Geographic Controls In Table 4 we augment the spec-
ification with additional controls and experiment with alternative ethnic inequality proxies. In
columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) we use ethnic Gini coefficients that exclude ethnic regions where
capitals fall. In columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we use ethnic Gini indicators that exclude groups
that constitute less than 1% of a country’s population.10 In all specifications we control for the
overall degree of spatial inequality in lights per capita using the spatial Gini index that is based
on Thiessen polygons and ethnic fractionalization.
In odd-numbered columns we control for a country’s size with the log of population in 2000
and log land area, as ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic inequality, and the overall degree of spatial
inequality are likely to be increasing in size. We also control for the absolute value of latitude,
because development is on average higher far from the equator (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999))
and because diversity is higher in areas close to the equator (e.g., Michalopoulos (2012)). The
ethnic inequality index enters with a negative and significant estimate across all permutations.
In even-numbered columns we condition on a rich set of geographic controls; to avoid concerns of
self-selecting the conditioning set, we follow the baseline specification of Nunn and Puga (2012)
and include (on top of the size controls and latitude) an index of terrain ruggedness, distance
to the coast, an index of gem quality, the percentage of each country with fertile soil and the
percentage of tropical land (the Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions). The negative
correlation between ethnic inequality and income per capita remains strong. The coefficient
on the ethnic inequality measures is quite similar to the more parsimonious specifications with
the size controls only. Thus while still an unobserved or omitted country-wide factor may jointly
affect development and ethnic inequality, the estimates clearly point out that the correlation does
not reflect (observable) mean differences in geographical characteristics or continental disparities.
Other We performed numerous additional sensitivity checks. For example, we dropped
from the estimation (typically small) countries with just one ethnic (or linguistic) group. The
results remain stable (see Appendix Table 2). We also repeated estimation excluding iteratively
observations from each continent or from each income group (following World Bank’s classifica-
tion); the results remain intact. We also estimate quantile (and median) regressions to explore
potential heterogeneity in the correlation between ethnic inequality and development.11 The
10Note that a priori there is no reason in excluding small groups, since ethnic hatred may be directed to tiny
groups that control a significant portion of the economy (Chua (2003)).
11For example in the similar to column (3)-Table 2a specification, quantile regression estimates are in the range
of −1.0 to −1.95.
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coefficient on the ethnic inequality index is quite stable across quantiles.
4 Inequality in Geographic Endowments and Ethnic Inequality
4.1 On the Origins of Ethnic Inequality
Given the strong correlation between ethnic inequality and under-development it is intriguing to
examine the roots of ethnic inequality.
We started our exploration of the origins of inequality across ethnic lines by examining the
association between the ethnic inequality proxies and commonly-used historical variables that
have been found to correlate with contemporary development. There is little evidence linking
contemporary differences in ethnic inequality to the legal tradition (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)), the conditions that European settlers faced at the time of coloniza-
tion (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)), the share of Europeans in the population (Hall
and Jones (1999) and Putterman and Weil (2010)), the inclusiveness of early institutions (Ace-
moglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008)), state history (Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman
(2002)), and borders’ design (Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)); for brevity we report
these results in Appendix Table 3. These insignificant associations suggest that the strong neg-
ative correlation between ethnic inequality and development does not reflect the aforementioned
aspects of history.
Then, motivated by the findings of Michalopoulos (2012) that ethnolinguistic diversity
increases with geographic heterogeneity, we conjecture that geographic and ecological endowments
play a role in explaining contemporary differences in income across ethnic lines. To the extent that
land endowments affect the diffusion and adoption of technology, then ethnic-specific inequality in
the distribution of geographic features would manifest itself in contemporary differences in well-
being across groups. To construct proxies of geographic inequality, we first obtain geo-referenced
data on elevation, land’s suitability for agriculture, distance to the coast and presence of water
bodies (lakes, rivers, and other streams) and construct for each ethnic area the mean value of
each of these measures. We then derive Gini coefficients at a country level that reflect group-
specific inequality in each of these dimensions. Following the same procedure to the one regarding
the construction of spatial inequality in luminosity (see Section 2), we estimated measures of the
overall degree of inequality in geographic endowments, constructing for each of the four geographic
features two spatial Gini coefficients: one based on the 2.5 x 2.5 decimal degrees pixels and one
based on Thiessen polygons.
In Table 5 we explore the association between ethnic inequality and these measures of
inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. Across all permutations, all four
ethnic Gini coefficients in geographic endowments enter with positive estimates suggesting that
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ethnic-specific differences in endowments translate into larger contemporary disparities in ethnic
development. Depending on the specification details -GREG or Ethnologue mapping, whether
we use all homelands or drop ethnic regions where capitals fall or small groups, whether we
condition on the level of geography and the overall degree of spatial inequality in each of the
four geographic features- different Gini coefficients of geographic inequality enter with significant
estimates. Thus while we cannot precisely identify which geographic feature(s) matter most,
the message from Table 6 is that differences in geography across ethnic regions translate into
differences in contemporary ethnic inequality.
We thus aggregate the four indexes of ethnic inequality in geographic endowments via
principal components. The use of factor analysis techniques is appealing because we have many
variables (Gini coefficients) that aim at capturing the same concept (with some degree of noise),
in our application inequality in geographic endowments. In line with this, there is strong positive
correlation between the four Gini coefficients (see Appendix Table 4). Table 6 reports the results
of the principal component analysis. The first principal component explains more than half of
the common variance of the four measures of inequality in geographic endowments. The second
principal component explains around 20% of the total variance, while jointly the third and fourth
principal components explain a bit less than a fourth of the total variance. Interestingly, all four
inequality measures load positively on the first principal component. Moreover, the eigenvalue
of the first principal component is close or greater than two (one being the rule of thumb), while
the eigenvalues of the other principal components are less than one. We thus focus on the first
principal component, which given the significant positive loadings of all Gini coefficients, we label
it "inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands".12
In Figures 8a − 8b we plot the ethnic inequality in luminosity against the first principal
component of inequality in ethnic-specific geographic endowments. There is a strong positive
association, suggesting that differences in geography explain a sizable portion of contemporary
differences in development across ethnic homelands.
In Table 7 we formally assess the role of ethnic-specific geographic inequality, as captured by
the composite index of inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic-linguistic homelands on
contemporary ethnic inequality. Columns (1) and (4) show that the strong correlation illustrated
in the figures is not driven by continental differences. In columns (2) and (5) we control for
the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments augmenting the specifications
with the first-principal component of the Gini coefficients in geography (using Thiessen polygons
with the same centroid as ethnic homelands). This has little effect on the coefficient of the
12We also estimated and incorporated in the factor analysis inequality across ethnic homelands on distance to the
capital city and on the presence of natural resources (namely oil, gold, and diamonds). The results, however, are
similar, in the sense that the first principal component is quite similar and adding more geographic Gini indicators
does not affect much the estimates.
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ethnic inequality in geographic endowments that retains its economic and statistical significance.
In contrast the Gini coefficient based on Thiessen polygons that captures the spatial degree in
geographic inequality enters with a small and statistically insignificant estimate. In columns (3)
and (6) we control for the level effects of geography, augmenting the specification with mean
elevation, land area under water, distance to the coast, and land suitability for agriculture. In all
permutations the composite index reflecting differences in geographic endowments across ethnic
homelands enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient.13 The estimate in column
(3) implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the inequality in geography across ethnic
homelands index (1.56 points, say from Mozambique to Malawi) translates into an 15 percentage
points increase in the ethnic inequality index (somewhat more than half a standard deviation;
see Table 1A).
4.2 Geographic Inequality and Development
Given the strong positive association between ethnic inequality -as reflected in lights per capita
across ethnic homelands- and inequality in geographic endowments, it is interesting to examine
whether contemporary development is systematically linked to the unequal distribution of geo-
graphic endowments across ethnic homelands. We thus estimated LS specifications associating the
log of real GDP p.c. in 2000 with the composite index of ethnic-specific inequality in geography.
While omitted-variables concerns cannot be eliminated, examining the role of inequality in geo-
graphic endowments across ethnic homelands on comparative development is useful in assuaging
concerns that the estimates in Tables 2−4 are driven by reverse causation. Moreover, geographic
inequality can be thought of as an alternative "primitive" measure of economic differences across
linguistic homelands (compared to the ethnic inequality index based on luminosity).
Results Table 8 reports the results. The coefficient on the proxy of ethnic inequality in
geographic endowments in (1) and (4) is negative and highly significant suggesting that countries
with sizable inequalities in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands are less developed.
In columns (2) and (5) we condition on the overall degree of inequality in geography with the
spatial Gini index based on Thiessen polygons, while in (3) and (6) we also control for land quality,
elevation, land area under water, and distance to the coast. The coefficient on the inequality in
geographic endowments across ethnic homelands index is negative in all permutations. The
coefficient is statistically different than zero in all but one specifications. In contrast the estimate
on the principal component that reflects the overall spatial inequality in geographic endowments
13Appendix Table 5 shows that the results are similar when we exclude from the estimation ethnic regions where
capital cities fall and small ethnic groups consisting less than 1% of a country’s population.
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is quantitatively small, changes sign and is statistically insignificant.14 The estimates in columns
(1) and (3) imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in geographic inequality across ethnic
homelands (1.5 points) decreases income per capita by approximately 30% (0.27 log points).
These results further show that inequality across ethnic regions is a feature of under-development.
Further Evidence We also estimated two-stage-least-squares estimates associating ge-
ographic inequality across ethnic homelands to ethnic inequality in lights per capita in the first-
stage and the component of ethnic inequality explained by geographic disparities across ethnic
regions with log per capita GDP in 2000 in the second stage. While the 2SLS estimates do not
necessarily identify the causal effect of ethnic inequality on development, they may be useful in
accounting for measurement error in the proxy measure of development (lights per capita). The
results (reported in Appendix Table 7) show the 2SLS estimate on the ethnic Gini coefficient is
highly significant and quite similar in magnitude to the LS estimate.
We also estimated specifications linking development to both the ethnic inequality measure
(based on lights per capita) and the composite index capturing inequality in geographic endow-
ments across ethnic homelands. The results, shown in Appendix Table 8, show that once we
condition on contemporary ethnic inequality differences in endowments across ethnic homelands
lose their explanatory power. While some peculiar type of measurement error may explain this
finding, this result indicates that inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands
affects contemporary development via its role on ethnic inequality.
Discussion The results in this section should not be interpreted as proving that unequal
geography across ethnic lines necessarily "causes" ethnic inequality (and under-development). It
is possible that certain groups for a plethora of reasons (e.g., faster early development, superior
military technology, or genetic differences) conquered higher quality territories. In this regard the
correlation between inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic lines and ethnic inequal-
ity in development (captured by lights per capita) indicates the sizable persistence of inequality.
Hence, one might view an unequal ethnic geography as a manifestation of deeper ethnic differ-
ences. Nevertheless, even in this case, it is the presence of an inherently unequal geography in
a country that partially allows these primordial ethnic differences to become salient (otherwise
there would be no "better land" for stronger groups to conquer and every group would have the
same land endowment).
14Appendix Table 6 reports otherwise identical specifications using the inequality measures that exclude from
the estimation capitals and small ethnic groups. The results are similar.
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5 Individual-Level Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and a Primer
on the Channels
In this section we take a micro approach that explores within-country across-district variation
in ethnic inequality and various development outcomes in a sample of 16 Sub-Saharan African
countries. The analysis serves two purposes. First, it is quite useful exploring the association be-
tween inequality across (and within) ethnic groups and well-being using micro data and exploiting
within (rather than across) country variation. Hence, instead of assigning parts of a country to
a single (or more) groups with linguistic maps, we use self-reported data on ethnic identity and
living conditions minimizing measurement error on the construction of ethnic inequality measures
and also accounting for migration (as we observe people from the same ethnic group in many
regions). Second, the plethora of questions of the Afrobarometer Surveys allows us to shed light
on the channels that link ethnic inequality to well-being.
Our focus on Sub-Saharan Africa is natural, as Africa is by far the most ethnically diverse
part of the world, while ethnic inequality is also quite high. Moreover, previous works suggest that
a considerable portion of Africa’s growth tragedy may be attributed to its ethnic diversity and
patronage politics across ethnic lines (e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), Franck and Rainer (2012)).
In the same vein, the literature on the origins of African political and economic development -
mostly in political science- places a key role to ethnic disparities in income (e.g., Robinson (2001)).
5.1 Ethnic Inequality and Well Being
5.1.1 Data
We use individual-level survey data from the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer surveys, that cover
16 Sub-Saharan African in 2005.15 The surveys are based on interviews of a random sample of
either 1, 200 or 2, 400 individuals in each country. We consider all individuals that have a clearly
identified ethnic identity and answer the questions on individual well-being.16 This is the case
for 20, 617 out of 25, 200 respondents; individuals reside in 1, 298 districts. Overall there are 213
ethnic groups across the 16 countries. In each district there are on average 3 ethnic groups (range
from 1 to 23 ethnicities). A (nice) feature of the data -that we exploit below- is that individuals
from the same ethnic group are present in more than one districts.
We construct inequality measures at the district level using individual responses on an
ordered (1−5) living conditions index where a score of 1 indicates very bad conditions; 2 fairly bad;
15These countries are: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Mali,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The 3rd round of the Surveys was also
conducted in Cape Verde and Zimbabwe but in these countries the ethnic identification question was not asked.
16We also drop individuals from ethnic groups with less than 10 respondents in each country (as in this case
both the ethnic-specific mean and the variance of living conditions are likely to be rather imprecisely estimated).
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3 neither good nor bad; 4 fairly good, and 5 very good. Based on these data we calculate Theil
indicators reflecting the between-group and the within-group components of overall inequality
(the results are similar with the Gini index; we prefer the Theil index as it can be decomposed to
a between ethnic group and a within ethnic group component). Table 1-Panel B reports summary
statistics of the overall, the between, and the within ethnic group inequality measures as well as
the other measures we consider below.
The formulae below describe the between-group and the within-group components of in-
equality in district d. Namely, for n groups within a district, yi,j denotes the living conditions of
individual j belonging to group i; yi reflects the mean living conditions of group i, and Y denotes
the total living conditions in a given district; ni is the number of individuals belonging to group
i and N is the total number of individuals in the district.
Tbetween =
∑
i
yi
Y
ln(
yi
Y
ni
N
) Twithin =
∑
i
yi
Y
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ln(
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1
ni
)
5.1.2 District-Level Estimates
Table 9 reports the results of the within-country analysis that associates ethnic inequality at
the district-level with well-being, as reflected in the 1 − 5 living conditions index (in Panel A)
and a 0− 9 education index (in Panel B). We augment the specification with the within-ethnic-
group Theil index, so as to jointly examine the role of between and within-group inequality.
In all specifications we control for the log number of ethnicities and the log of the number of
respondents in each district (the Data Appendix gives variable definitions and sources for all
variables, Table 1-Panels B and C report summary statistics while Appendix Table 9 provides
the pairwise correlations). Odd-numbered columns report estimates across all districts, while in
even-numbered columns we drop districts with only one ethnicity (as in these cases the between-
ethnic-group inequality is zero by construction).
Specifications (1) and (2) in Panel A show that district-level development -as reflected in
the average living condition across respondents- is significantly lower in districts with high levels
of between-group inequality. The coefficient on the between-group inequality index implies that
a 5% decrease in the Theil index (approximately two standard deviations; see Table 1-Panel B)
is associated with a 0.31 point increase in the average living conditions in a region (close to half
a standard deviation). The coefficient on the within-ethnicity Theil index is also negative and
highly significant, suggesting that inequality within groups is also a feature of regional under-
development. The estimate on the within-group Theil index suggests that a 5% decrease in
inequality (a bit more than one standard deviation) is associated with a 0.27 points increase
in the average level of living conditions in a district. The results are similar when we use the
average level of education at the district level as the dependent variable (in Panel B). Regions
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inhabited by more educated respondents are characterized by a lower degree of both between and
within-group disparities.
5.1.3 Individual-level Estimates
In columns (4) to (6) we report specifications associating between-group and within-group in-
equality at the district level with living conditions (Panel A) and education at (Panel B) at the
individual level. Moving to the individual level allows us to condition on numerous individual
characteristics (Table 1C reports summary statistics). Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
we control for the respondent’s age and age squared, a gender indicator, a dummy variable indi-
cating urban households, 22 religion fixed effects, and 25 occupational constants. We also control
for the share of the district’s population that is of the same ethnicity as the respondent. The es-
timates on the between and the within ethnic inequality measures in columns (3) and (4) suggest
that the negative correlations with the development outcomes (living conditions and education)
are not driven by (observable) individual characteristics.
Since members of the same ethnic group are present in more than one district, we also
explore whether conditional on ethnic-specific (observable and unobservable) characteristics, in-
equality across ethnic lines is an important correlate of individual well-being and education.
Overall almost all (210 out of the 213) ethnic groups in our sample may be found in more than
one district. The median ethnicity can be found in 20 districts. Conditioning on ethnicity fixed
effects seems a priori important, because recent works show that ethnic-specific historical traits,
related, for example, to the slave trades (e.g. Nunn (2008)), pre-colonial political centralization
(e.g., Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013)), and ethnic par-
titioning (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011)) have long-lasting effects on development.
The inclusion of country-ethnicity fixed effects also ensures that the negative association be-
tween ethnic inequality and development is not driven by certain ethnic groups -that may either
dominate politics in one country or suffer from discrimination.
The estimates on columns (5) and (6), imply that conditional on an array of individual
characteristics, respondents from the same ethnic group report worse living conditions when they
reside in districts characterized by larger ethnic inequality; also individuals in ethnically unequal
regions are also less educated. The estimate in column (6) in Panel B on the between-group Theil
index (−3.03) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic inequality is associated
with 0.25 standard deviation drop in the level of education. Interestingly within-group inequality
is also negatively related to both living conditions and education; the coefficient on the within
ethnic inequality Theil in column (6) of Panel B suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in the within-group inequality measure is associated with a 0.42 drop in education.
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Sensitivity Analysis We perturbed the empirical model in various ways to explore the
robustness of these results. First, rather than conditioning on the log number of ethnicities we
constructed a standard fractionalization measure. This has no effect on our main results. Second,
we repeated estimation using the mean log deviation index or the Gini coefficient. The results are
virtually unchanged. Third, we repeated the analysis restricting estimation to urban districts.
This is useful as inequality is higher in urban places and, unlike the cross-country setting, we can
properly account for increased population mixing usually associated with urbanization. Across all
permutations, the coefficient on the between-ethnic-group Theil index is negative and significant
at the 99% confidence level. Fourth, since the living conditions and the education measures
take discrete values we estimated ordered probit models with maximum likelihood again finding
similar results. To avoid cluttering the exposition the results are available upon request.
Summary To the best of our knowledge the results in Table 9 are the first piece of
evidence showing in a systematic manner with micro level data that inequality, both across
ethnic lines and within ethnicities, is inversely related to economic well-being in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
5.2 Channels
We now exploit the richness of the questionnaires of the Afrobarometer Surveys to explore several
channels linking ethnic inequality and well-being.
5.2.1 Economic Conditions and Political Power
Given the large amount of evidence on ethnic-based patronage politics and discrimination in
Africa, we begin our analysis on the mechanisms linking ethnic inequality to under-development
examining the link of a group’s well-being and its political power. Economic differences across
groups may translate into differences in the influence that ethnicities exert on the political land-
scape (and vice versa). We test this conjecture tabulating respondents’ answers to a question
aiming to measure the political influence of their group to that of other groups in the same coun-
try; the question gauging the political influence of the group reads: "Think about the conditions
of [respondent’s identity group]. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than
other groups in this country?" Higher values in this index -that ranges from 1 to 5- indicate more
influence (see the Data Appendix for details).
Figure 9a portrays the relationship between the average of a group’s mean living conditions
and its perceived political leverage (partialling out country-specific constants and the size of each
group). The evident positive association indicates that the economic standing of a group is
closely linked to its political power. Interestingly, the standardized "beta" coefficient of a group’s
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mean living conditions (0.36) is quite similar to the (similarly positive) "beta" coefficient of
the log number of respondents of the group (0.43), implying that the role of economic well-
being on political power is similar to that of group size; the latter is consistent with the recent
findings of Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2013) who document that a group’s size determines its
representation in the government across most Sub-Saharan African countries.
A similar picture emerges when we look at how a group’s living conditions relate to whether
the group’s respondents feel discriminated by the government; we derive a proxy of group discrim-
ination using the average value to the following question: "How often are [respondent’s identity
group] treated unfairly by the government?" The index ranges from 0 to 3 with higher values
indicating a higher frequency of unfair treatment. Figure 9b shows a strong association between
group-specific living conditions and group’s unfair treatment by the central government.
We also experimented with alternative measures of a group’s economic conditions. Specif-
ically, instead of measuring group’s economic status by taking the average of living conditions
across individuals, we use information from another question that reflects perceptions of group
members regarding the economic power of their own group relative to other groups in the country.
The question reads: "Think about the condition of [respondent’s identity group]. Are their eco-
nomic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?" Higher values
(range 1 to 5) indicate higher economic prosperity. There is a strong link between group-specific
economic conditions (versus other groups) and political influence or (lack thereof) discrimination
by the government. Please see Figures 10a, 10b, 10c, respectively.
5.2.2 Public Goods Provision
The Argument A large literature provides compelling evidence that public goods pro-
vision, redistributive policies, and effective governance are less prevalent in ethnically/racially di-
verse communities (e.g., Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdotte (2001)) and countries (Desmet, Ortuño-
Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012)). The more dispersed preferences are across groups then the desired
public goods will be more distant to the chosen one (see Luttmer (2001) for evidence). Hence, if
the level of income shapes preferences for public goods then group differences in economic condi-
tions will make group preferences diverge leading to lower public goods provision and increased
political tensions.17 In the same vein, one of the main empirical patterns of urban economics is
that the rich quite often want to "isolate"; since this desire may be especially strong when wealth
17Baldwin and Huber (2010) provide empirical evidence in line with this idea for 46 democracies. Similarly,
Deshpande (2000) and Anderson (2011) focus on income inequality across castes in India and associate between-
caste inequality to public goods. See also Loury (2002) for an overview of works studying the implications of the
evolution of racial inequality in the US.
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is correlated with group identity, ethnic inequality may lead to segregation.18 The link between
political inequality and economic inequality (shown above) may limit the supply of public goods
to geographically isolated minorities, with an insufficient supply to poorer and less powerful
groups. In contrast to the least well-off, the "rich" may get the desired services (of public goods)
by directly purchasing the respective private goods; obtaining, for example, a private electricity
generator instead of contributing to the extension of the public grid. This phenomenon would
exacerbate the under-provision of public goods.
Results Table 10a presents results relating inequality to access to various type of public
goods, namely piped water, sewage systems and electrification at the enumeration area. The unit
of analysis in columns (1), (4) and (7) is the district, while in the other columns the unit of analysis
is the individual. To further account for individual features, following Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) in these specifications we also include as additional controls five dummies for household’s
living conditions and nine indicators for education. To economize on space we focus on districts
with more than one ethnic group (the pattern is the same for the full sample as already shown
in Table 9). In all specifications the between-group inequality measure enters with a significantly
negative sign. On the contrary, the explanatory power of within-group inequality index is small
and the coefficient is often statistically indistinguishable from zero. For example, in column (5)
the beta coefficients for the between and within-group inequality are 0.049 and 0.006, respectively.
The results in Table 10a thus show that in districts marked by sizable inequalities across ethnic
lines, there is under-provision of public goods. Since we do not have random assignment on
ethnic inequality, these estimates do not necessarily identify causal effects; yet it is important
to note that we control for numerous individual level characteristics, including education, living
conditions, occupation, and in many specifications even for ethnicity fixed factors.
In Table 10b we report otherwise identical to Table 10a specifications but we now include as
an additional regressor the mean value of the living conditions index in each district. (Note that
in the individual-level regressions we continue controlling for individual level living conditions and
education). Access to public goods is negatively related to between-group inequality; in contrast
the correlation between public goods provision and within-group inequality is weak. This suggests
that the effect of access to public goods goes above and beyond the effect of ethnic inequality on
average well being, since we are controlling for it in these regressions.
Examples A few examples are useful to illustrate the pattern. We focus on the most
restrictive specifications that include ethnicity fixed-effects. The Pular in Senegal are found in 28
18Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that ethnic and linguistic segregation correlate negatively with proxies
of effective governance.
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of the 31 country’s districts. In the district of Matam, where the Pular coexist with the Soninke,
the Wolof and the Mandinka, between-group inequality is minimal (0.0005) whereas in the district
of Sedhiou, where the Pular coexist with the Wolof, the Mandinka, the Manjack, the English, the
Diola, and the Bambara, between-group inequality is 0.0145. In the Sedhiou district all Pular
report having no access to electricity, piped water and sewage system, whereas in Matam 72%
of the Pular have access to an electricity grid and access to clean water. Another example is
the Herero that are found in 32 of the 87 districts in Namibia. In the district of Otjiwarongo,
where we observe respondents from 5 groups, between-group inequality is minimal, 0.0038. In
this region all Herero reply having access to electricity, sewage system, and clean water. On the
contrary, in the district of Otjinene where between-group inequality is more than 10 times larger,
0.0408, only 43% of Herero reply having access to either an electricity grid or a sewage system
(in both regions within-group inequality is quite similar).
5.2.3 Fairness, Markets and Democracy
The argument In an influential work, Chua (2003) notes cases in which the spread of
democracy and free market institutions in the 1990s has led to animosity and institutional capture
by amplifying pre-existing ethnic tensions. Her thesis is that in the presence of ethnic inequality
(and especially when a small fraction of the population controls most wealth in the economy),
then democratization may result in a backlash, as most individuals perceive representative and
capitalist institutions as unfair, captured, and corrupt. 19
When the less-privileged, but more populous groups, come to power they may want to turn
the cards around, pursuing ethnic politics aiming to compensate their group for the perceived
injustice. The resulting belief that markets are unfair may also lead to under-supply of effort (as in
model by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006)). The strong correlation
documented above between well being and political influence goes in the same direction. It
undermines the perception of "equity" in the society.
Results Tables 11a and 11b report the results of our analysis examining the link be-
tween ethnic inequality (and within-ethnic-group) inequality and perceptions on the functioning
of democratic institutions. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable captures whether the re-
spondent feels that in some instances a non-democratic government is preferable to a democratic
one. In columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is a 0−4 range index reflecting the degree of sat-
isfaction with the way democracy works in the respondent’s country, whereas in columns (7)-(9)
19Chua (2003) presents case-study evidence supporting her thesis. She discusses, among others, the influence
of Chinese minorities in Philippines, Indonesia, and other Eastern Asian countries; the dominant role of (small)
Lebanese communities in Western Africa and the similarly strong influence of Indian societies in Eastern Africa.
Other examples, include the I(g)bo in Nigeria and the Kikuyu in Kenya.
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the dependent variable is an ordered variable (range from 1 to 5) where reflecting respondents’
belief on whether the constitution expresses the values and hopes of people. (So in all spec-
ifications higher values in the dependent variable reflect greater support/satisfaction with the
democracy/constitution). To get an idea of the overall variation in the outcome of interest 23%
of the respondents either (strongly) believe that the constitution does not reflect the values of
the people of the country with a similar 19% answering the opposite.
The evidence in Table 11a reveals that support and especially satisfaction with democ-
racy is overall negatively related to across-group inequality and to some extent to within-group
inequality. It is worthwhile to note that amongst the individual controls we always include the
living conditions and education level of the respondent, hence the negative association between
ethnic inequality and support for democracy operates beyond the influence of the former on the
well-being of the respondent. In Table 11b we also control for the overall level of well being of
the district as a whole. Doing so weakens considerably the role of cross-group inequality and
eliminates any influence of the within-group component. This finding suggests that the link
between ethnic inequality and disaffection with democratic institutions works primarily (though
not entirely) through the relationship of ethnic inequality and district-level wellbeing documented
above.
5.2.4 Other Channels
We also examined the link between ethnic inequality and proxies of social-civic capital investi-
gating whether ethnic inequality is related to trust. The results are inconclusive. It seems that
in Africa at least ethnic inequality and trust are not systematically linked.
Finally, we correlated inequality across and within ethnic groups with proxies of conflict at
the regional level, using geo-referenced data on conflict from the ACLED database. While many
have linked (ethnic and overall) inequality with conflict (see Horowitz (1985) for an overview),
as shown theoretically by Esteban and Ray (2011) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) the
relationship is not straightforward; for instance, a very rich and powerful group may be so strong
that any insurrection from (much) weaker groups is unthinkable. Likewise, a change in ethnic in-
equality starting from a relatively equal equilibrium may generate violence. Given the theoretical
ambiguities, perhaps it comes at no surprise that we could not detect a systematic relationship
between ethnic (or within group) inequality and conflict.20
20To economize on space, we do not report these results, which are available upon request.
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6 Conclusion
This study shows that ethnic differences in economic performance rather than the degree of
diversity or the overall level of inequality are negatively correlated with economic development.
While a large literature has examined (a) the interplay between inequality and development and
(b) the effects of various aspects of the ethnic composition (such as fragmentation, polarization,
segregation) on economic performance, there is little -if any- work studying the linkages between
ethnicity, inequality, and comparative development. This paper is a first effort to fill this gap.
In the first part of the paper we examine the role of ethnic inequality on development using
cross-country data. First, combining linguistic maps on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups
within countries with satellite images of light density at night we construct Gini coefficients
reflecting inequality in well-being across ethnic lines for a large number of countries. Ethnic
inequality is weakly correlated with the standard measures of income inequality and only modestly
correlated with ethnolinguistic fractionalization, polarization, and segregation. Second, we show
that the newly constructed proxy of ethnic inequality is strongly negatively correlated with per
capita GDP across countries. The correlation retains its significance when we condition on
the overall degree of spatial inequality in development, which is also negatively associated with
economic development (a new finding by itself). Including in the empirical specification both the
ethnic inequality index and the widely-used ethnolinguistic fragmentation indicators, the latter
loses significance, suggesting that it is inequality across ethnic lines that is correlated with poor
economic performance rather than fractionalization. Third, we conduct an initial step exploring
the roots of contemporary differences in well-being across ethnic groups within countries. In this
regard, we construct indicators of ethnic inequality in geographic endowments and show that
contemporary differences in development across ethnic homelands have a significant geographic
component. The latter is also inversely related to contemporary development.
In the second part of the paper we take a micro approach exploiting within-country differ-
ences in ethnic inequality for 16 Sub-Saharan countries covered by the Afrobarometer Surveys.
First, using individual-level data on ethnic self-identification and well-being we find a negative
association between ethnic inequality and regional development. The negative correlation be-
tween ethnic inequality and well-being retains significance even when we control for numerous
individual characteristics and account for unobserved ethnic-specific traits. Second, we explore
the mechanisms linking ethnic inequality to regional development. We show that economic in-
equality goes in tandem with political inequality. Our analysis further establishes that ethnic
inequality is closely linked to the under-provision of basic public goods and to some extent to the
lack of confidence in democratic institutions.
Overall, we view our work as a first step towards mapping and understanding the conse-
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quences and origins of contemporary differences in income across ethnic groups. Future research
should further explore the channels via which ethnic inequality interacts with comparative de-
velopment. Moreover, theoretical work is needed to shed light on the interaction between ethnic
identity, inequality, and various aspects of economic efficiency. We plan on tackling some of these
questions in future work.
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7 Data Appendix
7.1 Cross-Country Data
Income level: Log of per capita GDP at PPP (Chain Index) in 2000. Source: Penn World
Tables, Edition 7. Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).
Population: Log population in 2000. Source: Penn World Tables, Edition 7. Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2011).
Land Area: Log surface area. Source: Nunn and Puga (2011).
Rule of Law: The rule of law index is "capturing perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence." The standardized index which corresponds in 2000 ranges from −2.5 to
+2.5 with higher values indicating better functioning institutions. Source: World Bank Gov-
ernance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005)). available at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
Control of Corruption: The control of corruption index is "capturing perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests." The standardized index
which corresponds in 2000 ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 with lower values indicating a higher degree
of corruption. Source: World Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi (2005)). available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
Income Inequality. Adjusted Gini coefficient index averaged over the period 1965−1998.
Source: Easterly (2007); based on WIDER.
Ethnic/Linguistic/Religious Fractionalization: Index of ethnic/linguistic/religious
heterogeneity, constructed as one minus the Herfindahl index of the share of the largest eth-
nic/linguistic/religious groups. It reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals
follow different ethnolinguistic/religious groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Ethnic/Linguistic/Religious Segregation: Index ranging from zero to one capturing
ethnic/linguistic/religious segregation (clustering) within countries. If each region is comprised
of a separate group, then the index is equal to 1, and this is the case of full segregation. If every
region has the same fraction of each group as the country as a whole, the index is equal to 0,
this is the case of no segregation. The index is increasing in the square deviation of regional-level
fractions of groups relative to the national average. The index gives higher weight to the deviation
of group composition from the national average in bigger regions than in smaller regions." Source:
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Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2012).
Ethnolinguistic Polarization 1: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization that achieves a
maximum score when a country is occupied by two groups of the same population. Source:
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b).
Ethnolinguistic Polarization 2: The polarization index accounts for the degree of sim-
ilarity between linguistic groups using the Ethnologue linguistic tree. Source: Esteban, Mayoral,
and Ray (2012).
Cultural Fragmentation: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization that accounts for
the degree of similarity between linguistic groups using the Ethnologue linguistic tree. Source:
Fearon (2003).
Soil quality: Percentage of each country with fertile soil. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Ruggedness: The terrain ruggedness index quantifies topographic heterogeneity. The
index is the average across all grid cells in the country not covered by water. The units for the
terrain ruggedness index correspond to the units used to measure elevation differences. Rugged-
ness is measured in hundreds of metres of elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926
metres on the equator or any meridian) apart. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Tropical: The percentage of the land surface of each country with tropical climate. Source:
Nunn and Puga (2012).
Desert: The percentage of the land surface area of each country covered by sandy desert,
dunes, rocky or lava flows. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Latitude: Absolute latitude is expressed in decimal degrees, for the geographical centroid
of the country. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Gem-Quality Diamond Extraction: Carats of gem-quality diamond extraction be-
tween 1958 and 2000, normalized by land area. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Common Law: Indicator variable that identifies countries that have a common law legal
system. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and Nunn and Puga
(2012).
European Descent: The variable, calculated from version 1.1 of the migration matrix
of Putterman and Weil (2010), estimates the percentage of the year 2000 population in every
country that is descended from people who resided in Europe in 1500. Source: Nunn and Puga
(2012).
Settler Mortality: Log of mortality rates faced by European colonizers in late 19th
century. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
State Antiquity: Normalized state antiquity Index in 1950, using a 1% discount rate.
Source: Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002).
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Border Straightness Index: The 0− 1 index reflects how straight -and thus most likely
to be non-organic- national borders are. Source: Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011).
Ethnic Partitioning: Percentage of the population of a country that belongs to parti-
tioned ethnic groups. Source: Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011).
Regional Fixed Effects: The region constants correspond to: South Asia, East Asia
and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, Middle East and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The classification
follows World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Light Density at Night: Light density is calculated averaging light density observations
across pixels that fall within each territory (ethnic/linguistic homeland, Thiessen polygon, and
pixel) and then dividing by population.
Source: Available at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/global_composites_v2.html.
Water Area: Total area covered by rivers or lakes in square kilometers. Source: Con-
structed using the "Inland water area features" dataset from Global Mapping International, Col-
orado Springs, CO, USA. Global Ministry Mapping System.
Elevation: Average elevation in kilometers. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0
(CD-ROM), Boulder, Colorado. http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/data.php?incdataset=Topography
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average land quality for cultivation within each
country. The index is the product of two components capturing the climatic and soil suitability
for farming. Source: Michalopoulos (2012); Original Source: Atlas of the Biosphere.
Available at http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/grid_data_sel.php.
Distance to the Sea Coast: The geodesic distance from the centroid of each country
to the nearest coastline, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Mapping System. Series issue:
Version 3.0
7.2 Micro-Level Data from Afrobarometer Surveys (3rd Round)
Living Conditions: Respondent’s view of their present living conditions. The question (Q4B)
reads "In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?". The answers can
be: (i) very bad, (ii) fairly bad, (iii) neither good nor bad, (iv) fairly good, or (v) very good. For
the district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each district. Source:
2005 Afrobarometer Surveys.
Education: Respondent’s education/schooling. The question (Q90) reads "What is the
highest level of education you have completed?". The answers are: 0=No formal schooling, 1=In-
33
formal schooling (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school
completed, 4=Some secondary school/ High school, 5=Secondary school completed/High school,
6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a techni-
cal/polytechnic/college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate. For the
district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each district. Source: 2005
Afrobarometer Surveys.
Access to piped water: Response to the question (Q116e) on "whether in the enumer-
ation area there is a piped water system that most houses could access". For the district-level
analysis responses are averaged within a district. Question was filled in conjunction with field
supervisor. For the district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each
district. Source: 2005 Afrobarometer Surveys
Access to sewage system: Response to the question (Q116f) on "whether in the enu-
meration area there is a sewage system that most houses could access". For the district-level
analysis responses are averaged within a district. Question was filled in conjunction with field
supervisor. For the district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each
district. Source: 2005 Afrobarometer Surveys.
Access to an electricity grid: Response to the question (Q116d) on "whether in the
enumeration area there is an electricity grid that most houses could access". For the district-level
analysis responses are averaged within a district. Question was filled in conjunction with field
supervisor. For the district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each
district. Source: 2005 Afrobarometer Surveys
Support for Democracy: Ordered (0, 1, 2) variable capturing support for democracy,
based on the following question (Q37). "Which of these three statements is closest to your own
opinion? A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B: In some circumstances,
a non-democratic government can be preferable. C: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what
kind of government we have." We assign a value of 2 for individuals who reply A, a value of
1 for individuals who choose B, and a 0 for individuals who choose C. For the district-level
analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each district. Source: 2005 Afrobarometer
Surveys.
Satisfaction with Democracy: Ordered (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) variable reflecting satisfaction with
democracy. The question (Q47) reads. "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy
works in [Ghana/Kenya/etc.] are you?" The replies are 0=My country is not a democracy, 1=Not
at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied. For the district-level
analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each district. Source: 2005 Afrobarometer
Surveys.
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Constitution: Ordered variable (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) reflecting people’s beliefs (satisfaction)
about whether the constitution expresses the values and hopes of people. The question (Q52A)
reads: Constitution expresses values and hopes. Do you disagree or agree with the following
statement: Our constitution expresses the values and hopes of the [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] peo-
ple. : 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly
Agree. For the district-level analysis responses are averaged across all individuals in each district.
Source: 2005 Afrobarometer Surveys.
Ethnic-level Economic Conditions (power): Ethnic-level average of individual re-
sponses to the following question (Q80A) reflecting economic conditions of each group in the
country. "Think about the condition of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [respondent’s iden-
tity group]. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in
this country? " 1=Much Better, 2=Better, 3=Same, 4=Worse, 5=Much Worse. Source: 2005
Afrobarometer Surveys.
Ethnic-level Political Conditions (power): Ethnic-level average of individual re-
sponses to the following question (Q80B) reflecting political conditions of each group in the
country. "Think about the condition of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [respondent’s iden-
tity group]. Are their political conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in
this country? " 1=Much Better, 2=Better, 3=Same, 4=Worse, 5=Much Worse. Source: 2005
Afrobarometer Surveys.
Ethnic-level Unfairness (Discrimination): Ethnic-level average of individual responses
to the following question (Q81) reflecting unfairness (discrimination) of each group by the gov-
ernment of each country."How often are _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _s [respondent’s identity group]
treated unfairly by the government?" 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always. Source: 2005
Afrobarometer Surveys.
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ÜEthnic Homelands in Afghanistan
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Figure 1a
Ethnic Homelands in Afghanistan
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Figure 1b
Lights per Capita across Ethnic Homelands
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Figure 2a: Lights across 2.5 by 2.5 dd Boxes
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Figure 2b: Lights across Thiessen Polygons
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Obs. mean st. dev. p25 median p75 min max
Number of Ethnicities (GREG) 173 11.52 14.17 1.00 3.00 8.00 13.00 94.00
Ethnic Gini in 2009 (GREG), All Groups 173 0.42 0.26 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.63 0.96
Ethnic Gini in 2000 (GREG), All Groups 173 0.42 0.26 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.65 0.96
Ethnic Gini in 1992 (GREG), All Groups 173 0.48 0.29 0.00 0.21 0.56 0.72 0.97
Number of Languages (ETHNOLOGUE) 173 41.91 99.78 1.00 3.00 9.00 36.00 791.00
Ethnic Gini in 2009 (ETHNOLOGUE), All Groups 173 0.45 0.33 0.00 0.13 0.47 0.77 0.97
Ethnic Gini in 2000 (ETHNOLOGUE), All Groups 173 0.46 0.34 0.00 0.11 0.51 0.77 0.98
Ethnic Gini in 1992 (ETHNOLOGUE), All Groups 173 0.50 0.35 0.00 0.15 0.55 0.83 0.99
Number of Pixels 173 24.28 63.84 1.00 4.00 8.00 22.00 637.00
Spatial Gini in 2009, Pixels 173 0.40 0.26 0.00 0.17 0.40 0.60 0.98
Spatial Gini in 2000, Pixels 173 0.40 0.26 0.00 0.17 0.40 0.60 0.98
Spatial Gini in 1992, Pixels 173 0.45 0.27 0.00 0.21 0.47 0.68 0.95
Number of Thiessen Polygons 173 50.79 98.05 1.00 7.00 17.00 54.00 698.00
Spatial Gini in 2009, Thiessen Polygons 173 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.21 0.48 0.71 0.97
Spatial Gini in 2000, Thiessen Polygons 173 0.48 0.29 0.00 0.23 0.46 0.73 0.97
Spatial Gini in 1992, Thiessen Polygons 173 0.52 0.31 0.00 0.23 0.52 0.81 0.99
Obs. mean st. dev. p25 median p75 min max
Theil Index - Overall Inequality 1298 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.31
Theil Index - Between-Group Inequality 1298 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.21
Theil Index - Within-Group Inequality 1298 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.31
Living Conditions Index 1298 2.71 0.67 2.25 2.75 3.17 1.00 4.88
Education 1298 4.01 1.42 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 8.75
Access to Sewage System 1277 0.24 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Access to Clean Piped Water 1283 0.47 0.45 0.00 0.44 1.00 0.00 1.00
Access to Electricity Grid 1289 0.54 0.45 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 1298 0.71 0.27 0.50 0.76 1.00 0.11 1.00
Number of Ethnic Groups per District 1298 2.74 2.24 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 18.00
Number of Respondents per District 1298 16.29 23.16 7.00 8.00 16.00 1.00 357.00
Support for Democracy 1284 1.57 0.39 1.38 1.67 1.86 0.00 2.00
Satisfaction with Democracy 1286 2.60 0.67 2.13 2.67 3.04 0.00 4.00
Constitution Expresses People's Hopes-Values 1290 3.52 0.61 3.15 3.59 3.98 1.00 5.00
Table 1A: Summary Statistics - Cross Country Inequality Measures
Table 1B: Summary Statistics - Afrobarometer Sample - District Level
Obs. mean st. dev. p25 median p75 min max
Theil Index - Overall Inequality 21138 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.31
Theil Index - Between-Group Inequality 21138 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.21
Theil Index - Within-Group Inequality 21138 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.31
Living Conditions Index 21138 2.63 1.20 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 5.00
Education 21138 4.09 2.02 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 10.00
Access to Sewage System 20487 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Access to Clean Piped Water 20818 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Access to Electricity Grid 20878 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 21138 0.60 0.35 0.25 0.69 0.94 0.00 1.00
Number of Ethnic Groups per District 21138 4.85 3.93 2.00 4.00 7.00 1.00 18.00
Number of Respondents per District 21138 49.19 63.35 12.00 24.00 63.00 1.00 357.00
Support for Democracy 18199 1.58 0.73 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00
Satisfaction with Democracy 18024 2.56 1.06 2.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 4.00
Constitution Expresses People's Hopes-Values 17733 3.51 1.18 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 5.00
Panel A reports summary statistics for the main ethnic inequality and overall spatial inequality measures employed in the cross-country 
analysis. Section 3 gives details on the construction of these measures. 
Panel B reports summary statistics for all measures, employed in the cross-district analysis within African countries (Afrobarometer 
sample). Panel C reports summary statistics for all measures, employed in the cross-individual analysis within African countries 
(Afrobarometer sample).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources.
Table 1C: Summary Statistics - Afrobarometer Sample - Individual Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Ethnic Inequality -1.4707*** -1.4003*** -1.4985*** -1.1868*** -1.1099** -1.2446** -1.3447*** -1.4580***
  [Gini Coeff., GREG]  (0.2504)  (0.3633)  (0.4018)  (0.4069)  (0.5045)  (0.4835)  (0.5148)  (0.4905)
-5.87 -3.85 -3.73 -2.92 -2.20 -2.57 -2.61 -2.97
Spatial Inequality 1 -1.1508*** -0.1112 -0.1186 -0.0592                
  [Gini Coeff., Pixels]  (0.2786)  (0.3780)  (0.3809)  (0.3820)                
-4.13 -0.29 -0.31 -0.15                
Spatial Inequality 2 -1.1612*** 0.0373 0.0880 0.1060
  [Gini Coeff., Thiessen Polyg]  (0.2559)  (0.3961)  (0.4084)  (0.4155)
-4.54 0.09 0.22 0.26
Log Number of Languages -0.3037*** -0.0887 -0.0893 -0.0912 -0.1675 -0.1723
 [GREG] (0.0605) (0.0930) (0.0936) (0.0949) (0.1286) (0.1304)
-5.02 -0.95 -0.95 -0.96 -1.30 -1.32
Ethnic Inequality in Population 0.5164 0.5305
  [Gini Coeff., GREG] (0.4472) (0.4465)
1.15 1.19
adjusted R-squared 0.661 0.626 0.659 0.631 0.659 0.643 0.661 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659
observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2a - Baseline Estimates: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000), Atlas Naradov Mira
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Ethnic Inequality -1.1281*** -1.0245*** -1.0839*** -1.2806*** -1.1734** -1.2309*** -1.0657*** -1.2554***
  [Gini Coeff., ETHNO]  (0.2267)  (0.2975)  (0.3817)  (0.3694)  (0.4625)  (0.4528)  (0.3747)  (0.4300)
-4.98 -3.44 -2.84 -3.47 -2.54 -2.72 -2.84 -2.92
Spatial Inequality 1 -1.1508*** -0.2035 -0.1857 -0.1531                
  [Gini Coeff., Pixels]  (0.2786)  (0.3524)  (0.3617)  (0.3508)                
-4.13 -0.58 -0.51 -0.44                
Spatial Inequality 2 -1.1612*** -0.0732 -0.0884 0.1967
  [Gini Coeff., Thiessen Polyg]  (0.2559)  (0.4343)  (0.4354)  (0.4539)
-4.54 -0.17 -0.20 0.43
Log Number of Languages -0.1730*** 0.0389 0.0357 0.0399                
 [ETHNO] (0.0467) (0.0741) (0.0759) (0.0751)                
-3.70 0.53 0.47 0.53                
Ethnic Inequality in Population 0.6678* 0.7013*  
  [Gini Coeff., ETHNO] (0.3727) (0.3742)
1.79 1.87
adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.626 0.653 0.631 0.652 0.625 0.653 0.651 0.651 0.66 0.661
observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2b - Baseline Estimates: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000), Ethnologue
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini coefficients reflect inequality in lights per capita 
across ethnic homelands. In Table 3A we use the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) to aggregate lights per capita across ethnic homelands.  In Table 3B we use 
the digitized version of the Ethnologue database to aggregate lights per capita across linguistic homelands. 
The spatial Gini coefficient 1 captures the degree of spatial inequality across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes/pixels intersected by national 
boundaries are of smaller size). The spatial Gini coefficient 2 captures the degree of spatial inequality across Thiessen polygons in each country. Thiessen polygons have the 
unique property that each polygon contains only one input point, and any location within a polygon is closer to its associated point than to the point of any other polygon. The 
input points are the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. To construc the spatial inequality 2 index we intersect the 7,570 Thiessen polygons 
with the country boundaries of 2000 and compute the spatial Gini across the resulting polygons within each country.
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ethnic Inequality -1.4977*** -1.6771*** -1.5567*** -1.5782*** -1.1099*** -0.8248** -1.1186*** -1.1438***
   [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4011)  (0.3955)  (0.4075)  (0.3924)  (0.3716)  (0.3417)  (0.3744)  (0.3756)
-3.73 -4.24 -3.82 -4.02 -2.99 -2.41 -2.99 -3.04
Ethnic Fragmentation -0.0097 0.1256                
 (0.3590)  (0.3431)                
-0.03 0.37                
Cultural Fragmentation -0.3417 0.0339                
 (0.3520)  (0.3469)                
-0.97 0.10                
Ethno-linguistic Polarization 1 0.464 0.5817                
 (0.9745)  (0.9820)                
0.48 0.59                
Ethno-linguistic Polarization 2 1.9997 2.1173*  
 (1.2688)  (1.1802)
1.58 1.79
Spatial Inequality 2  0.0397 0.0739 0.0641 0.0563 -0.0862 -0.468 -0.0577 -0.0568
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4163)  (0.4827)  (0.3928)  (0.3845)  (0.4408)  (0.4760)  (0.4230)  (0.4224)
0.10 0.15 0.16 0.15 -0.20 -0.98 -0.14 -0.13
adjusted R-squared 0.657 0.694 0.653 0.658 0.65 0.675 0.646 0.651
observations 173 150 172 172 173 150 172 172
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Table 3 - Sensitivity Checks A: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000)
Conditioning on Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation and Polarization
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. In columns (1) and (5) we 
control for ethnic fragmentation using an index that reflects the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will be 
members of the same group (from Alesina et al., 2003). In columns (2) and (6) we control for cultural (linguistic) fragmentation using an 
index (from Fearon, 2003) that accounts for linguistic distances among ethnic groups. In columns (3) and (7) we control for ethnic 
polarization, using the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) index. In columns (4) and (8) we control for ethnic polarization using a 
polarization index that accounts for linguistic distances among ethnic groups (from Duclos, Esteban, and Rey (2004) and Esteban and Rey 
(2011, 2012)). 
In all specification we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in a country using the Gini coefficient of lights per capita based on 
Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. All specifications 
include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ethnic Inequality -1.5123*** -1.3073*** -1.1601*** -1.0370*** -2.0069*** -1.5247*** -1.0650*** -0.8779*** -1.1723*** -0.8062** -1.3370***-1.2490***
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4357)  (0.3815)  (0.4023)  (0.3309)  (0.5701)  (0.5501)  (0.3480)  (0.2997)  (0.3747)  (0.3552)  (0.4800)  (0.4535)
-3.47 -3.43 -2.88 -3.13 -3.52 -2.77 -3.06 -2.93 -3.13 -2.27 -2.79 -2.75
Spatial Inequality 2 0.0743 0.2679 -0.7642 -0.275 -0.1669 -0.0063 -0.2035 0.0377 -0.4793 -0.2985 -0.2473 0.1042
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4710)  (0.4043)  (0.5395)  (0.4501)  (0.4365)  (0.3968)  (0.4908)  (0.4370)  (0.4822)  (0.4757)  (0.5105)  (0.4425)
0.16 0.66 -1.42 -0.61 -0.38 -0.02 -0.41 0.09 -0.99 -0.63 -0.48 0.24
0.0943 0.1826 0.0709 0.2411 0.5099 0.5054 0.1308 0.2437 -0.1721 0.1237 0.1909 0.3108
 (0.3716)  (0.3162)  (0.3904)  (0.3437)  (0.4040)  (0.3667)  (0.3614)  (0.3134)  (0.3958)  (0.3544)  (0.3578)  (0.3151)
0.25 0.58 0.18 0.7 1.26 1.38 0.36 0.78 -0.43 0.35 0.53 0.99
                              
adjusted R-squared 0.663 0.723 0.676 0.741 0.673 0.723 0.654 0.715 0.672 0.723 0.654 0.7173
Observations 173 173 152 152 173 173 173 173 147 147 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. In columns (1)-(6) we use the digitized version of the Atlas 
Narodov Mira (GREG) to aggregate lights per capita across ethnic homelands and construct the ethnic inequality measures.  In columns (7)-(12) we use the digitized version of the 
Ethnologue database to aggregate lights per capita across linguistic homelands and construct the ethnic inequality measures. For the construction of the ethnic inequality measures 
(Gini coefficients) in columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) we exclude ethnic areas where capital cities fall. For the construction of the ethnic inequality measures (Gini coefficients) in 
columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we exclude small ethnic groups consisting of less than one percept of country’s population. 
Odd-numbered columns include as controls absolute latitude, log land area, and log population in 2000 (simple set of controls). Even-numbered columns include as controls 
absolute latitude, log land area, log population in 2000, an index of terrain ruggedness, the percentage of each country with fertile soil, the percentage of each country with tropical 
climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, and an index of gem-quality diamond extraction (rich set of controls). In all specifications we control for ethnic fragmentation 
using an index that reflects the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will be members of the same group (from Alesina et al., 2003). 
In all specification we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in a country using the Gini coefficient of lights per capita based on Thiessen polygons that use as input 
points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4 - Sensitivity Checks B: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000)
Additional Controls and Alternative Measures of Ethnic Inequality
All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals Excl. Small Groups All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals Excl. Small Groups
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Ethnic 
Fragmentation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Gini Coef. - Sea Distance 0.0489 0.1379 0.1857 0.0552 0.1090 0.1961 0.0355 -0.1886 -0.1756 0.0897 0.0276 0.0231
 (0.0956)  (0.1231)  (0.1156)  (0.1274)  (0.1611)  (0.1494)  (0.0969)  (0.1567)  (0.1622)  (0.1143)  (0.1639)  (0.1481)
Gini Coef. - Elevation 0.4343 0.8727 0.6973 0.0953 0.1046 0.0754 0.6292 3.0353** 1.7750 0.0027** 0.0038*** 0.0019
 (0.3304)  (0.6673)  (0.6334)  (0.1206)  (0.1262)  (0.1178) (0.4782) (1.2705) -1.2926 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Gini Coeff. -Land Quality 0.2528*** -0.1028 -0.121 0.3067*** 0.1227 0.1227 0.3680*** 0.6496*** 0.6000*** 0.3338*** 0.4759** 0.4116**
 (0.0910)  (0.1775)  (0.1813)  (0.0935)  (0.1816)  (0.1872)  (0.0978)  (0.2038)  (0.1654)  (0.0922)  (0.1873)  (0.1658)
Gini Coeff. - Water Area 0.5632*** 0.4985*** 0.4744*** 0.4476*** 0.4011*** 0.3914*** 0.6698*** 0.5550*** 0.5862*** 0.5238*** 0.4206*** 0.4330***
 (0.0550)  (0.0773)  (0.0733)  (0.0970)  (0.1275)  (0.1280)  (0.0621)  (0.0857)  (0.0875)  (0.0786)  (0.0997)  (0.0934)
adjusted R-squared 0.674 0.6674 0.6408 0.5967 0.5988 0.6078 0.7511 0.7537 0.7595 0.7169 0.714 0.7398
Observations 173 169 162 151 150 150 168 166 160 144 143 142
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Spatial No Spatial No Spatial No Spatial
Excl. Capitals 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Table 5. The Origins of Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality in Development across Ethnic 
All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals All Ethnic Areas
Spatial & 
Level
Spatial & 
Level
Spatial & 
Level
Spatial & 
Level
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. The dependent 
variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic-linguistic homelands, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in (1)-
(6) and Ethnologue in (7)-(12). To construct the inequality measures in geographic endowments we first estimate the distance of the centroid of each ethnic homeland to the closest 
sea coast, average elevation, average soil quality, and the area of each homeland covered by water (lakes, rivers, and other streams) and then construct Gini coefficients capturing 
inequality in each of these geographic features for each country. 
In columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) we use all ethnic-linguistic homelands; in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) we exclude ethnic-linguistic regions where capital cities fall. In columns (2), 
(5), (8), and (11) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments using the Gini coefficient of each of these features (distance to the closest sea 
coast, elevation, soil quality, water area) based on Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. In 
columns (3), (6), (9), and (12) we also control for the mean value of distance to closest sea coast, elevation, soil quality, and area under water. All specifications include continental 
fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Eigenvalue Variable 1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 4th PC
1st Principal Component 2.474 0.618 Gini Sea Distance 0.482 -0.666 0.080 0.563
2nd Principal Component 0.708 0.177 Gini Elevation 0.491 0.444 -0.720 0.208
3rd Principal Component 0.481 0.120 Gini Land Quality 0.479 0.531 0.689 0.120
4th Principal Component 0.337 0.084 Gini Water Area 0.545 -0.277 -0.027 -0.791
1st Principal Component 2.420 0.567 Gini Sea Distance 0.537 -0.413 0.153 0.720
2nd Principal Component 0.753 0.200 Gini Elevation 0.540 -0.259 0.468 -0.650
3rd Principal Component 0.515 0.128 Gini Land Quality 0.402 0.873 0.230 0.152
4th Principal Component 0.312 0.105 Gini Water Area 0.508 0.020 -0.840 -0.190
1st Principal Component 2.389 0.597 Gini Sea Distance 0.498 -0.633 0.186 0.563
2nd Principal Component 0.739 0.185 Gini Elevation 0.478 0.355 -0.770 0.229
3rd Principal Component 0.583 0.146 Gini Land Quality 0.445 0.643 0.610 0.128
4th Principal Component 0.289 0.072 Gini Water Area 0.571 -0.246 0.008 -0.783
1st Principal Component 1.804 0.451 Gini Sea Distance 0.594 0.188 -0.468 0.627
2nd Principal Component 1.052 0.263 Gini Elevation 0.186 0.865 0.456 -0.095
3rd Principal Component 0.703 0.176 Gini Land Quality 0.466 -0.455 0.722 0.234
4th Principal Component 0.441 0.110 Gini Water Area 0.629 -0.096 -0.228 -0.737
1st Principal Component 2.132 0.533 Gini Sea Distance 0.502 -0.559 0.131 0.647
2nd Principal Component 0.814 0.203 Gini Elevation 0.497 0.404 -0.759 0.117
3rd Principal Component 0.580 0.145 Gini Land Quality 0.462 0.616 0.637 0.045
4th Principal Component 0.474 0.118 Gini Water Area 0.536 -0.381 0.032 -0.752
1st Principal Component 2.082 0.521 Gini Sea Distance 0.480 -0.608 0.377 0.507
2nd Principal Component 0.849 0.212 Gini Elevation 0.515 0.347 -0.662 0.420
3rd Principal Component 0.598 0.150 Gini Land Quality 0.451 0.639 0.612 -0.116
4th Principal Component 0.471 0.118 Gini Water Area 0.549 -0.319 -0.212 -0.744
The table reports the results of the principal component analysis that is based on four measures (Gini coefficients) reflecting inequality in 
geographic endowments in distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water across ethnic homelands 
(Panels A, B, C, and D), pixels of 2.5 x 2.5 decimal degrees (in Panel E) and Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the 
linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset (Panel F). Column (1) reports the eigenvalue of each principal component and 
column (2) gives the percentage of the total variance explained by each principal component. The other columns give the factor loadings in 
the four principal components of the Gini coefficient reflecting inequality in distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, 
and area under water.
Panel F: Gini Coefficient - Overall Spatial Inequality Index 1 - Pixel 2.5 x 2.5 degrees (164 countries)
Panel E: Gini Coefficient - Overall Spatial Inequality Index 2 - Thiessen Polygons (169 countries)
Table 6 - Principal Component Analysis
Factor Loadings
Panel A: Gini Coefficient GREG - All Groups (173 countries)
Panel B: Gini Coefficient GREG - Excluding Capitals (151 countries)
Panel C: Gini Coefficient ETHNOLOGUE - All Groups (168 countries)
Panel D: Gini Coefficient ETHNOLOGUE - Excluding Capitals (144 countries)
Variance 
Explained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.1227*** 0.1089*** 0.0973*** 0.1613*** 0.1523*** 0.1588***
(0.0088) (0.0178) (0.0171) (0.0095) (0.0196) (0.0199)
14.00 6.13 5.70 16.99 7.76 7.98
0.0109 0.0068 0.0075 -0.006
(0.0182) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0228)
0.6 0.35 0.37 -0.26
Adjusted R-squared 0.623 0.616 0.605 0.695 0.689 0.688
Observations 173 169 162 168 166 160
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Geography No No Geography
Table 7: The Origins of Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with inequality in geographic endowments 
across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across 
ethnic-linguistic homelands in 2000, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue 
(in columns (4)-(6)). 
The main independent variable is a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. The 
index is the first principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, land 
suitability for agriculture, and area under water. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality 
in geographic endowments using a composite index that aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients on distance to the 
coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, water area across Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the 
linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. In columns (3) and (6) we also control for the mean value of distance to 
the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.1789*** -0.2311*** -0.1770** -0.1611*** -0.058 -0.1526*
(0.0405) (0.0851) (0.0891) (0.0459) (0.0956) (0.0860)
-4.42 -2.71 -1.99 -3.51 -0.61 -1.78
0.0755 0.048 -0.0898 0.0268
(0.0970) (0.1113) (0.0986) (0.1093)
0.78 0.43 -0.91 0.24
adjusted R-squared 0.629 0.646 0.668 0.623 0.639 0.673
Observations 173 169 162 168 166 160
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Geography No No Geography
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary economic development with inequality in geographic 
endowments across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. 
The main independent variable is a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands, using 
the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue (in columns (4)-(6)). The index is the first 
principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability for 
agriculture, and area under water. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in 
geographic endowments using a composite index that aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients on distance to the 
coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, water area across Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the 
linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. In columns (3) and (6) we also control for the mean value of distance to 
the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Table 8: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary 
Development 
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Between Group Ineq. -5.4994*** -6.2017*** -5.9472*** -5.8051*** -4.7228*** -5.1732***
  [Theil Index]  (0.8809)  (1.0308)  (1.0874)  (0.8644)  (0.8488)  (0.8604)
Within Group Ineq. -2.6220** -5.7490*** -2.3695*** -5.4641*** -1.4248*** -4.5081***
  [Theil Index]  (0.9085)  (1.0771)  (0.4606)  (0.5605)  (0.3351)  (0.5255)
adjusted R-squared 0.356 0.500 0.154 0.166 0.188 0.188
Observations 1298 842 20617 16580 20617 16580
Between Group Ineq. -4.4948*** -4.7501*** -3.2780*** -2.7169** -3.4919*** -3.0329***
  [Theil Index]  (0.9452)  (1.2602)  (1.0931)  (1.1152)  (1.0357)  (1.0617)
Within Group Ineq. -3.5337*** -3.9965*** -1.5350*** -1.8955*** -1.3886*** -2.0192***
  [Theil Index]  (0.5205)  (0.8417)  (0.5110)  (0.6833)  (0.5003)  (0.6909)
adjusted R-squared 0.506 0.547 0.484 0.483 0.498 0.495
Observations 1298 842 20617 16580 20617 16580
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-Ethnicity Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
District-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample; Districts All >1 group All >1 group All >1 group
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All variables are constructed using data from the 3rd round of the 
Afrobarometer Surveys. Clustered at the district level standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The table reports OLS estimates, associating two proxies of well-being (living conditions in Panel A and education in Panel B) with 
inequality between and within ethnic groups at the district level, as reflected in the Theil index. The dependent variable in Panel A is a 1-
5 living conditions index; the dependent variable in Panel B is a 1-10 education index. Columns (1)-(2) report district-level estimates, 
while columns (3)-(8) report individual level estimates. The between-ethnic-group and the within-ethnic-group Theil indicators are based 
on individuals’ responses on living conditions. The district-level conditioning set includes the log number of ethnic groups in each 
district, the log number of respondents in each district, and district-level ethnic fractionalization.  The individual-level conditioning set 
includes age, age squared, a gender indicator variable, 22 religion fixed effects and 25 occupation fixed effects. Odd-numbered columns 
report estimates in the full sample. In even-numbered columns we exclude from the estimation districts with respondents from just one 
ethnic group. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). Specifications (5) and (6) include ethnicity-country 
fixed effects (constants not reported). 
Panel B: Education
Panel A: Living Conditions
Table 9 - Ethnic Inequality and Regional Development within African Countries
District-level and Individual-Level Analysis Using Data from the Afrobarometer Surveys
District-Level Individual-Level
District District District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Between Group Ineq. -2.5917** -1.9828***-1.8395*** -1.9295*** -1.3094** -1.3981*** -1.7328** -1.1828* -1.2205** 
  [Theil Index]  (0.9664)  (0.6336)  (0.5793)  (0.4999)  (0.5217)  (0.5135)  (0.7864)  (0.6140)  (0.5995)
Within Group Ineq. -0.9725** -0.4500 -0.4652 -0.4209 0.058 0.1477 -1.2173*** -0.2566 -0.4046
  [Theil Index]  (0.3637)  (0.3774)  (0.3563)  (0.5185)  (0.3194)  (0.3325)  (0.2345)  (0.3421)  (0.3107)
adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.392 0.441 0.219 0.399 0.421 0.307 0.44 0.478
Observations 837 16378 16378 833 16067 16067 839 16429 16429
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Ethnicity Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample, Districts >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups
Individual Level
Table 10a - Ethnic Inequality and Public Goods Provision within African Countries
Piped Water Sewage System Electrification
Individual Level Individual Level
District District District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Between Group Ineq. -2.1828* -1.8972***-1.8137*** -1.7909*** -1.3979*** -1.4289*** -1.3118 -1.3686** -1.2675** 
  [Theil Index]  (1.0963)  (0.6526)  (0.5900)  (0.5177)  (0.5370)  (0.5290)  (0.8746)  (0.6350)  (0.6173)
Within Group Ineq. -0.5935* -0.3748 -0.4443 -0.2897 -0.0195 0.1229 -0.8267*** -0.4204 -0.4431
  [Theil Index]  (0.3305)  (0.4178)  (0.3875)  (0.5116)  (0.3330)  (0.3385)  (0.1815)  (0.3633)  (0.3399)
Mean Living Conditions at the District 0.0659 0.0137 0.0043 0.0228 -0.0143 -0.0052 0.0678* -0.0297 -0.0079
 (0.0451)  (0.0307)  (0.0288)  (0.0243)  (0.0229)  (0.0240)  (0.0332)  (0.0302)  (0.0269)
adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.392 0.441 0.219 0.399 0.421 0.307 0.44 0.478
Observations 837 16378 16378 833 16067 16067 839 16429 16429
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Ethnicity Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample, Districts >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups >1 groups
The table reports OLS estimates, associating measures of public goods (access to piped water, access to a sewage system, and access to an electricity grid) with inequality between 
and within ethnic groups at the district level, as reflected in the Theil index. Columns (1), (4), and (7) report district-level estimates, while columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) report 
individual level estimates. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for households that have access to clean piped water; in 
columns (4)-(6) is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for households that have access to a sewage system; in columns (7)-(9) is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
of one for households that have access to an electricity grid. The between-ethnic-group and the within-ethnic-group Theil indicators are based on individuals’ responses on living 
conditions. 
The district-level conditioning set includes the log number of ethnic groups in each district, the log number of respondents in each district, and district-level ethnic fractionalization.  
The individual-level conditioning set includes age, age squared, a gender indicator variable, 22 religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, 5 living conditions fixed effects, and 
9 education fixed effects. In all specifications we exclude from the estimation districts with respondents from just one ethnic group. Panel B reports otherwise identical to Panel A 
specifications including also in the set of explanatory variables the mean value of the living conditions index in the district. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants 
not reported). Specifications (3), (6), and (9) include ethnicity-country fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
All variables are constructed using data from the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer Surveys. Clustered at the district level standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Individual Level Individual Level Individual Level
Table 10b - Ethnic Inequality and Public Goods Provision within African Countries
Sewage System ElectrificationPiped Water
District District District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Between Group Ineq. -1.4171* -0.6833 -0.9821 -2.5130** -1.9787*** -1.8511*** -1.8538* -1.6343* -1.4638*
  [Theil Index]  (0.7702)  (0.6387)  (0.6341)  (0.8794)  (0.7619)  (0.6824)  (0.9479)  (0.8803)  (0.8169)
Within Group Ineq. -0.5123 -0.5371* -0.4089 -1.3277** -1.2481** -0.9595** -0.0716 -0.6032 0.1742
  [Theil Index]  (0.3996)  (0.3228)  (0.3101)  (0.4655)  (0.5182)  (0.4654)  (0.8013)  (0.5818)  (0.4933)
adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.085 0.098 0.414 0.156 0.184 0.187 0.052 0.071
Observations 838 14381 14381 837 14231 14231 839 13923 13923
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Ethnicity Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample, Districts >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group
Individual Level Individual Level Individual Level
Table 11a - Ethnic Inequality and Beliefs on Democracy within African Countries
Support for Democracy Satisfaction with Democracy Constituion Reflects People's Values-Hopes
District District District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Between Group Ineq. -1.2924* -0.6556 -1.0286 -1.7639* -1.181 -1.5854** -0.933 -0.4923 -0.8835
  [Theil Index]  (0.6844)  (0.6489)  (0.6442)  (0.9030)  (0.7817)  (0.6962)  (0.9094)  (0.9260)  (0.8553)
Within Group Ineq. -0.3964 -0.5134 -0.4458 -0.6305 -0.5556 -0.7441 0.7744 0.3774 0.6381
  [Theil Index]  (0.3520)  (0.3497)  (0.3268)  (0.5149)  (0.5320)  (0.4956)  (0.7115)  (0.5962)  (0.5442)
Mean Living Conditions at the District 0.0202 0.0044 -0.0077 0.1215** 0.1271*** 0.0445 0.1492*** 0.1756*** 0.0932** 
 (0.0301)  (0.0257)  (0.0260)  (0.0429)  (0.0386)  (0.0343)  (0.0427)  (0.0482)  (0.0410)
adjusted R-squared 0.243 0.085 0.098 0.421 0.157 0.184 0.2 0.054 0.072
Observations 838 14381 14381 837 14231 14231 839 13923 13923
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Ethnicity Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample, Districts >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group >1 group
Table 11b - Ethnic Inequality and Beliefs on Democracy within African Countries
Support for Democracy Satisfaction with Democracy Constitution Reflects People's Values-Hope
The table reports OLS estimates, associating measures reflecting individual’s beliefs on support and satisfaction with democracy with inequality between and within ethnic groups at the 
district level, as reflected in the Theil index. Columns (1), (4), and (7) report district-level estimates, while columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) report individual level estimates. The 
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is a trichotomous (0-3 range) variable that reflects’ individual’s beliefs on support for democratic rule; in columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is 
an ordered (0-4 range) index that reflects individual’s satisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions; in columns (7)-(9) the dependent variable is an ordered (1-5 range) index 
that captures individual’s beliefs on whether the constitution reflects people’s hope and values. The between-ethnic-group and the within-ethnic-group Theil indicators are based on 
individuals’ responses on living conditions. The district-level conditioning set includes the log number of ethnic groups in each district, the log number of respondents in each district, and 
district-level ethnic fractionalization.  The individual-level conditioning set includes age, age squared, a gender indicator variable, 22 religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, 5 
living conditions fixed effects, and 9 education fixed effects. 
In all specifications we exclude from the estimation districts with respondents from just one ethnic group. Panel B reports otherwise identical to Panel A specifications including also in the 
set of explanatory variables the mean value of the living conditions index in the district.All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). Specifications (3), (6), and 
(9) include ethnicity-country fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All variables are constructed using data from 
the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer Surveys. Clustered at the district level standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Individual Level Individual Level Individual Level
Ethnic Gini 2009 (GREG) 1
Ethnic Gini 2000 (GREG) 0.9545* 1
Ethnic Gini 1992 (GREG) 0.9382* 0.9519* 1
Ethnic Gini 2009 (ETHN) 0.7679* 0.7564* 0.7686* 1
Ethnic Gini 2000 (ETHN) 0.7625* 0.7619* 0.7696* 0.9914* 1
Ethnic Gini 1992 (ETHN) 0.7719* 0.7686* 0.7958* 0.9759* 0.9775* 1
Spatial Gini 2009 (Thiessen) 0.7784* 0.7760* 0.7755* 0.8180* 0.8205* 0.8082* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Thiessen) 0.7724* 0.7903* 0.7777* 0.8053* 0.8218* 0.8012* 0.9835* 1
Spatial Gini 1992 (Thiessen) 0.7870* 0.7986* 0.8136* 0.8242* 0.8289* 0.8397* 0.9639* 0.9604* 1
Spatial Gini 2009 (Pixels) 0.6826* 0.7002* 0.6633* 0.7161* 0.7214* 0.7096* 0.7699* 0.7845* 0.7638* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Pixels) 0.6851* 0.7190* 0.6642* 0.7129* 0.7273* 0.7066* 0.7710* 0.8002* 0.7676* 0.9736* 1
Spatial Gini 1992 (Pixels) 0.6860* 0.7187* 0.6886* 0.7347* 0.7446* 0.7535* 0.7807* 0.7970* 0.8129* 0.9384* 0.9463* 1
Overall Spatial Inequality Indicators - Gini Coefficients
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure - Cross-Country Measures
Panel A: Ethnic Inequality Indicators (all ethnic areas)
Ethnic Inequality Indicators - Gini Coefficients
GREG Ethnologue Spatial Gini 1 Spatial Gini 2
Ethnic Gini 2009 (GREG) 1
Ethnic Gini 2000 (GREG) 0.9440* 1
Ethnic Gini 1992 (GREG) 0.8965* 0.9209* 1
Ethnic Gini 2009 (ETHN) 0.6673* 0.6748* 0.6438* 1
Ethnic Gini 2000 (ETHN) 0.6735* 0.6942* 0.6507* 0.9905* 1
Ethnic Gini 1992 (ETHN) 0.6399* 0.6627* 0.6918* 0.9533* 0.9521* 1
Spatial Gini 2009 (Thiessen) 0.6750* 0.6898* 0.6205* 0.8343* 0.8405* 0.7942* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Thiessen) 0.6788* 0.7183* 0.6356* 0.8160* 0.8368* 0.7843* 0.9835* 1
Spatial Gini 1992 (Thiessen) 0.6842* 0.7189* 0.6672* 0.8385* 0.8503* 0.8360* 0.9639* 0.9604* 1
Spatial Gini 2009 (Pixels) 0.6118* 0.6319* 0.5494* 0.6884* 0.7013* 0.6513* 0.7699* 0.7845* 0.7638* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Pixels) 0.6023* 0.6410* 0.5475* 0.6746* 0.6960* 0.6434* 0.7710* 0.8002* 0.7676* 0.9736* 1
Spatial Gini 1992 (Pixels) 0.6117* 0.6494* 0.5657* 0.7152* 0.7333* 0.7038* 0.7807* 0.7970* 0.8129* 0.9384* 0.9463* 1
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure - Cross-Country Measures
Panel B: Ethnic Inequality Indicators (excl. capitals)
Ethnic Inequality Indicators - Gini Coefficients Overall Spatial Inequality Indicators - Gini Coefficients
GREG Ethnologue Spatial Gini 1 Spatial Gini 2
Ethnic Gini 2000 - All (GREG) 1
Ethnic Gini 2000 - All (ETHN)0.7619* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Thiessen) 0.7903* 0.8218* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Pixels) 0.7190* 0.7273* 0.8002* 1
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.4464* 0.4666* 0.5099* 0.4640* 1
Linguistic Fragmentation 0.3878* 0.4123* 0.4653* 0.3506* 0.6885* 1
Religious Fragmentation -0.057 -0.0035 0.044 0.0041 0.1629* 0.2748* 1
Ethnic Segregation 0.2944* 0.4468* 0.3348* 0.2064* 0.4813* 0.3705* -0.0442 1
Linguistic Segregation 0.2437* 0.3711* 0.2266* 0.2131* 0.3945* 0.3056* -0.0363 0.8422* 1
Religious Segregation 0.2552* 0.2449* 0.2249* 0.2097 0.2502* 0.2911* 0.0811 0.2205 0.1276 1
Ethnic Polarization 1 0.1042 0.0955 0.0144 0.0942 0.3065* 0.2617* -0.1019 0.1196 0.1781 0.0251 1
Ethnic Polarization 2 0.0497 0.0335 -0.0345 0.0254 0.1697* 0.1032 -0.0389 0.0654 0.1151 -0.0012 0.5161* 1
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure - Cross-Country Measures
Panel C: Correlation of Ethnic Inequality Indicators with Measures of Ethnic-Linguistic-Religious Fragmentation, Polarization, and 
Segregation
Ethnic Gini - All (GREG) 1.0000
Ethnic Gini - Excl. Capitals (GREG)0.9404* 1.0000
Ethnic Gini - Excl. Small (GREG)0.6992* 0.6137* 1.0000
Ethnic Gini - All (ETHN) 0.7619* 0.7096* 0.6666* 1
Ethnic Gini - Excl. Capitals (ETHN)0.7229* 0.6942* 0.6560* 0.9831* 1
Ethnic Gini - Excl. Small (ETHN)0.6337* 0.6069* 0.7785* 0.8183* 0.7687* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Thiessen) 0.7903* 0.7183* 0.7104* 0.8218* 0.8368* 0.7914* 1
Spatial Gini 2000 (Pixels) 0.7190* 0.6410* 0.5593* 0.7273* 0.6960* 0.6448* 0.8002* 1
Income Inequality (Gini coeff.)0.2643* 0.2608* 0.3063* 0.3260* 0.3151* 0.4228* 0.3452* 0.2887* 1
Log real GDP p.c. in 2000 -0.5294* -0.5193* -0.6552* -0.4950* -0.5250* -0.5795* -0.5611* -0.4556* -0.3751* 1
Rule of Law in 2000 -0.4933* -0.5324* -0.5081* -0.4464* -0.4869* -0.4999* -0.4982* -0.4108* -0.3998* 0.7952* 1
Control of Corruption in 2000-0.4570* -0.4944* -0.4984* -0.4207* -0.4447* -0.4753* -0.4658* -0.3677* -0.4041* 0.7400* 0.9423* 1
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure - Cross-Country Measures
The table reports the correlation structure between the main variables employed in the cross-country empirical analysis. Panel A gives the correlation between the main ethnic 
inequality measures and the overall spatial inequality measures in 1992, 2000, and 2009. 
Panel B gives the correlation between ethnic inequality and the overall spatial inequality measures in 1992, 2000, and 2009. For the estimation of the ethnic inequality measures 
(Gini coefficients) we exclude ethnic regions where capital cities fall. 
Panel C gives the correlation between the main ethnic inequality measures and the overall spatial inequality measures in 2000 with measures reflecting ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious fragmentation, segregation, and polarization.
Panel D gives the correlation between the main ethnic inequality measures and the overall spatial inequality measures in 2000 with income inequality and measures capturing 
economic and institutional development in 2000.
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Panel D: Correlation of Ethnic Inequality Indicators with Measures of Development and Income Inequality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ethnic Inequality -1.6096*** -1.3812*** -1.1601*** -1.0370*** -2.0382*** -1.4606*** -1.1754*** -0.7805** -1.1723*** -0.8062** -1.3301*** -0.9689*
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4575)  (0.3835)  (0.4023)  (0.3309)  (0.5897)  (0.5397)  (0.3749)  (0.3514)  (0.3747)  (0.3552)  (0.5041)  (0.4964)
Spatial Inequality 2 -0.4639 -0.0641 -0.7642 -0.275 -0.8093* -0.4447 -0.4912 -0.3364 -0.4793 -0.2985 -0.6475 -0.3788
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.5269)  (0.4456)  (0.5395)  (0.4501)  (0.4791)  (0.4388)  (0.4748)  (0.4669)  (0.4822)  (0.4757)  (0.5049)  (0.4473)
0.0863 0.2430 0.0709 0.2411 0.4818 0.534 -0.1566 0.1251 -0.1721 0.1237 -0.1395 0.1456
 (0.3834)  (0.3359)  (0.3904)  (0.3437)  (0.4254)  (0.3974)  (0.3721)  (0.3373)  (0.3958)  (0.3544)  (0.3780)  (0.3440)
               
adjusted R-squared 0.680 0.741 0.676 0.741 0.691 0.739 0.677 0.729 0.672 0.723 0.674 0.7288
Observations 153 153 152 152 153 153 148 148 147 147 148 148
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich
Ethnic 
Fragmentation
Excl. Small Groups
Appendix Table 2 - Additional Sensitivity Checks: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000)
Excluding Countries with One Ethnic-Linguistic Group
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals Excl. Small Groups All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals 
Panel A: Conditioning on Overall Spatial Inequality Index based on Thiessen Polygons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ethnic Inequality -1.3891*** -1.0916*** -1.1161*** -0.9068*** -1.9173*** -1.2843** -1.0929*** -0.7285** -1.1124*** -0.7595*** -1.2700***-0.8987** 
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4090)  (0.3465)  (0.3490)  (0.2934)  (0.5602)  (0.5102)  (0.3121)  (0.2925)  (0.3027)  (0.2829)  (0.3931)  (0.4043)
Spatial Inequality 1 -1.1909** -0.9672** -1.5238*** -1.2222*** -1.3685*** -1.1437*** -1.3388*** -1.0038** -1.3646*** -1.0080** -1.3792***-0.9862** 
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.5053)  (0.4173)  (0.4953)  (0.4028)  (0.4729)  (0.4032)  (0.4747)  (0.4440)  (0.4659)  (0.4347)  (0.4688)  (0.4195)
0.1211 0.2454 0.1247 0.2408 0.5101 0.5178 -0.1528 0.0998 -0.1663 0.0986 -0.1355 0.1206
 (0.3782)  (0.3285)  (0.3804)  (0.3273)  (0.4144)  (0.3778)  (0.3627)  (0.3376)  (0.3835)  (0.3516)  (0.3659)  (0.3418)
                              
adjusted R-squared 0.689 0.748 0.692 0.753 0.701 0.749 0.690 0.736 0.687 0.731 0.687 0.7354
Observations 153 153 152 152 153 153 148 148 147 147 148 148
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich Simple Rich
Ethnic 
Fragmentation
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Excl. Small GroupsAll Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals Excl. Small Groups All Ethnic Areas Excl. Capitals 
Both panels report cross-country OLS estimates. In all specifications we drop countries with just one ethnic group (in (1)-(6)) or just one linguistic group (in (7)-(12)). The dependent 
variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. In all specifications in Panel A we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in a country using the Gini coefficient of 
lights per capita based on Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. In all specifications in Panel B we 
control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in a country using the Gini coefficient of lights per capita based on polygons that have the same size (2.5 x 2.5 degrees).  
In columns (1)-(6) we use the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) to aggregate lights per capita across ethnic homelands and construct the ethnic inequality 
measures.  In columns (7)-(12) we use the digitized version of the Ethnologue database to aggregate lights per capita across linguistic homelands and construct the ethnic inequality 
measures. For the construction of the ethnic inequality measures (Gini coefficients) in columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) we exclude ethnic areas where capital cities fall. For the 
construction of the ethnic inequality measures (Gini coefficients) in columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we exclude small ethnic groups consisting of less than one percept of country’s 
population. Odd-numbered columns include as controls absolute latitude, log land area, and log population in 2000 (simple set of controls). Even-numbered columns include also 
control for an index of terrain ruggedness, the percentage of each country with fertile soil, the percentage of each country with tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free 
coast, and an index of gem-quality diamond extraction (rich set of controls). In all specifications we control for ethnic fragmentation using an index that reflects the likelihood that 
two randomly chosen individuals in one country will be members of the same group. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 2 - Additional Sensitivity Checks: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000), cont.
Excluding Countries with One Ethnic-Linguistic Group
Panel B: Conditioning on Overall Spatial Inequality Index based on Pixels of same Size (2.5 x 2.5 degrees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Land Area 0.0247** 0.0235** 0.0204** 0.0071 0.0147 0.0171 0.0034 0.0024
 (0.0098)  (0.0096)  (0.0094)  (0.0152)  (0.0101)  (0.0111)  (0.0124)  (0.0113)
Log Population 0.003 0.0029 0.0004 -0.0046 -0.0030 -0.0052 -0.0166 -0.0164
 (0.0117)  (0.0127)  (0.0125)  (0.0173)  (0.0148)  (0.0149)  (0.0134)  (0.0212)
Latitude 0.0008 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0021 0.0045** 0.0030 0.0026 0.0053** 
 (0.0018)  (0.0022)  (0.0023)  (0.0032)  (0.0022)  (0.0022)  (0.0023)  (0.0025)
Ruggedness -0.0031 -0.0051 0.0200  (0.0022) 0.0013 0.0023 0.0128
 (0.0104)  (0.0107)  (0.0249)  (0.0107)  (0.0116)  (0.0120)  (0.0098)
Soil Quality 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0002
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)
Tropical Climate 0.0001 0.00001 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0009* 0.0006 0.0011** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)
Gem Stones 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Distance to the Coast 0.0486 0.0476 0.0677 0.0226 0.1407*** 0.0393 0.0107
 (0.0422)  (0.0412)  (0.0606)  (0.0437)  (0.0483)  (0.0432)  (0.0381)
Common Law -0.0410                
 (0.0320)                
               
Log Settler Mortality 0.0133                
 (0.0205)                
               
European Descent -0.0011*                
 (0.0006)                
               
Executive Constraints -0.0012                
 at Independence  (0.0411)                
State Antiquity Index 0.1211
 (0.0829)
Ethnic Partitioning -0.0004
 (0.0005)
Border Straightness -0.0213
 (0.8016)
Spatial Inequality 2 0.6669*** 0.6515*** 0.6429***0.6650*** 0.7010*** 0.5805*** 0.7564*** 0.7448***
   [Gini Coeff.]  (0.0816)  (0.0875)  (0.0891)  (0.1092)  (0.0783)  (0.0884)  (0.0846)  (0.1047)
adjusted R-squared 0.684 0.676 0.687 0.665 0.668 0.631 0.723 0.653
Observations 173 173 173 77 157 133 142 113
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table 3A: Geography, History and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality, Atlas Naodov Mira
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Land Area 0.0247** 0.0235** 0.0204** 0.0071 0.0147 0.0171 0.0034 0.0024
 (0.0098)  (0.0096)  (0.0094)  (0.0152)  (0.0101)  (0.0111)  (0.0124)  (0.0113)
Log Population 0.003 0.0029 0.0004 -0.0046 -0.0030 -0.0052 -0.0166 -0.0164
 (0.0117)  (0.0127)  (0.0125)  (0.0173)  (0.0148)  (0.0149)  (0.0134)  (0.0212)
Latitude 0.0008 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0021 0.0045** 0.0030 0.0026 0.0053** 
 (0.0018)  (0.0022)  (0.0023)  (0.0032)  (0.0022)  (0.0022)  (0.0023)  (0.0025)
Ruggedness -0.0031 -0.0051 0.0200  (0.0022) 0.0013 0.0023 0.0128
 (0.0104)  (0.0107)  (0.0249)  (0.0107)  (0.0116)  (0.0120)  (0.0098)
Soil Quality 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0002
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)
Tropical Climate 0.0001 0 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0009* 0.0006 0.0011** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)
Gem Stones 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Distance to the Coast 0.0486 0.0476 0.0677 0.0226 0.1407*** 0.0393 0.0107
 (0.0422)  (0.0412)  (0.0606)  (0.0437)  (0.0483)  (0.0432)  (0.0381)
                
Common Law -0.0410                 
 (0.0320)                 
                
Log Settler Mortality 0.0133                 
 (0.0205)
European Descent -0.0011*                 
 (0.0006)                 
                
Executive Constraints -0.0012                 
 at Independence  (0.0411)                 
State Antiquity Index 0.1211                 
 (0.0829)
Ethnic Partitioning -0.0004
 (0.0005)
Border Straightness -0.0213
 (0.8016)
Spatial Inequality 2 0.6669*** 0.6515*** 0.6429***0.6650*** 0.7010*** 0.5805*** 0.7564*** 0.7448***
   [Gini Coeff.]  (0.0816)  (0.0875)  (0.0891)  (0.1092)  (0.0783)  (0.0884)  (0.0846)  (0.1047)
adjusted R-squared 0.6652 0.659 0.6606 0.6239 0.6493 0.622 0.6826 0.6502
Observations 173 173 173 77 157 133 142 113
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table 3B: Geography, History and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality, Ethnologue
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with various geographic and historical variables. The 
dependent variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic-linguistic homelands, using the 
digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in Panel A and Ethnologue in Panel B. In all specifications we control for the overall degree of 
spatial inequality in a country using the Gini coefficient of lights per capita based on Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of 
the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The 
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Ethnic Gini - Sea Distance 1
Spatial Gini 1 - Sea Distance 0.7971* 1
Mean Sea Distance -0.0306 -0.1910* 1
Ethnic Gini - Elevation 0.3879* 0.2692* 0.2612* 1
Spatial Gini 1 - Elevation 0.3313* 0.2698* 0.2131* 0.8776* 1
Mean Elevation 0.0254 -0.0979 0.5010* 0.6012* 0.5662* 1
Ethnic Gini - Land Quality 0.3702* 0.2460* 0.3698* 0.5181* 0.4110* 0.3367* 1
Spatial Gini 1 - Land Quality 0.3007* 0.2311* 0.3577* 0.4475* 0.4061* 0.3360* 0.9253* 1
Mean Land Quality 0.0299 0.0005 -0.1677* -0.0075 0.0180 0.0238 -0.4825* -0.5423* 1
Ethnic Gini - Water Area 0.6298* 0.4833* 0.3505* 0.5288* 0.3904* 0.3606* 0.5002* 0.4133* 0.1217 1
Spatial Gini 1 - Water Area 0.5081* 0.4924* 0.3819* 0.4074* 0.3746* 0.3735* 0.3315* 0.3049* 0.0735 0.7775* 1
Mean Water Area 0.2944* 0.2538* 0.1472 0.2078* 0.1995* 0.0365 0.2996* 0.3041* -0.1798* 0.1648* 0.1236 1
The table reports the correlation structure between the main geographic variables employed in the cross-country analysis within African countries. Specifically the table gives the 
correlation between inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands, inequality in geographic endowments across pixels of 2.5x2.5 degrees, and the level of 
geography, as reflected in distance to the sea, elevation, an index of land (soil) suitability (quality) for agriculture, and water area. * indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
Appendix Table 4: Correlation Structure Inequality Measures in Geographic Endowments
Distance to the Sea Elevation Land Quality Water Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0984*** 0.0846*** 0.0841*** 0.1422*** 0.1220*** 0.1334***
(0.0102) (0.0158) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.0180) (0.0175)
9.67 5.34 5.73 11.53 6.78 7.64
0.0256 0.0122 0.0282 -0.0048
(0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0224) (0.0235)
1.22 0.58 1.25 -0.20
adjusted R-squared 0.538 0.542 0.582 0.676 0.674 0.700
Observations 151 150 150 144 143 142
0.0760*** 0.0710*** 0.0680*** 0.0934*** 0.0957*** 0.0960***
(0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0079) (0.0105) (0.0101)
10.62 7.92 7.57 11.76 9.08 9.47
0.0024 0.0043 -0.0062 -0.0079
(0.0079) (0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0127)
0.31 0.45 -0.62 -0.62
adjusted R-squared 0.6165 0.6227 0.6106 0.6365 0.6348 0.6202
Observations 173 169 162 169 167 161
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Geography No No Geography
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with inequality in geographic endowments 
across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic-
linguistic homelands in 2000, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue (in 
columns (4)-(6)). To construct the ethnic inequality index (Gini coefficient) we exclude ethnic regions where capital cities fall (in Panel 
A) and ethnic regions where small ethnicities consisting less than one percent of a country’s population reside (in Panel B).  
The main independent variable is a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. The 
index is the first principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability 
for agriculture, and area under water. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in 
geographic endowments using a composite index that aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients on distance to the coast, 
elevation, land suitability for agriculture, water area across Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the linguistic 
homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset. In columns (3) and (6) we also control for the mean value of distance to the coast, 
elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 5: The Origins of Contemporary Ethnic Inequality. Sensitivity Analysis
 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Panel A: Excluding Capitals
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
Panel B: Excluding Small Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.1176** -0.1152* -0.1268* -0.0861 -0.008 -0.0593
(0.0476) (0.0676) (0.0704) (0.0621) (0.0956) (0.0980)
-2.47 -1.7 -1.80 -1.39 -0.08 -0.6
0.0052 0.0153 -0.1313 -0.0876
(0.1094) (0.1244) (0.1011) (0.1185)
0.05 0.12 -1.30 -0.74
adjusted R-squared 0.633 0.633 0.664 0.638 0.640 0.662
Observations 151 150 150 144 143 142
-0.2075*** -0.1951*** -0.1709*** -0.1781*** -0.1346* -0.1732** 
(0.0431) (0.0576) (0.0591) (0.0446) (0.0695) (0.0671)
-4.81 -3.39 -2.89 -4.00 -1.94 -2.58
-0.0061 0.0005 -0.0267 0.0352
(0.0557) (0.0718) (0.0735) (0.0874)
-0.11 0.01 -0.36 0.40
adjusted R-squared 0.6397 0.6550 0.6780 0.6259 0.6393 0.6729
Observations 173 169 162 169 167 161
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Geography No No Geography
Ethnologue
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
Panel B: Excluding Small Groups
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary economic development with inequality in geographic 
endowments across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. To construct the ethnic 
inequality index and the inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands (Gini coefficients) we exclude ethnic regions 
where capital cities fall (in Panel A) and ethnic regions where small ethnicities consisting less than one percent of a country’s 
population reside (in Panel B).  
The main independent variable is a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands, using the 
digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue (in columns (4)-(6)). The index is the first 
principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, 
and area under water. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments 
using a composite index that aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients on distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability 
for agriculture, water area across Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the 
Ethnologue dataset. In columns (3) and (6) we also control for the mean value of distance to the coast, elevation, land suitability for 
agriculture, and area under water. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Excluding Capitals
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
Appendix Table 6: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary 
Development.  Sensitivity Analysis
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-1.4574*** -2.1223*** -1.8196** -0.9983*** -0.3808 -0.9613*
(0.3034) (0.7983) (0.8996) (0.2655) (0.6024) (0.5002)
-4.8 -2.66 -2.02 -3.76 -0.63 -1.92
0.0986 0.0603 -0.0869 0.021
(0.1015) (0.1086) (0.0981) (0.0982)
0.97 0.56 -0.89 0.21
First-Stage F-score 195.96 37.54 32.43 138.19 24.99 26.43
Observations 173 169 162 168 166 160
-1.1956** -1.3624* -1.5067* -0.6051 -0.0657 -0.4444
(0.4778) (0.7382) (0.7919) (0.4015) (0.7518) (0.6787)
-2.5 -1.85 -1.90 -1.51 -0.09 -0.65
0.04 0.0337 -0.1295 -0.0898
(0.1146) (0.1228) (0.1139) (0.1062)
0.35 0.27 -1.14 -0.85
First-Stage F-score 93.418 28.529 32.801 133.040 45.965 58.354
Observations 151 150 150 144 142 142
-2.7288*** -2.7499*** -2.5126*** -1.9062*** -1.4074** -1.8042***
(0.5617) (0.8320) (0.8745) (0.4444) (0.7026) (0.6425)
-4.86 -3.31 -2.87 -4.29 -2.00 -2.81
0.0006 0.0113 -0.0355 0.0208
(0.0547) (0.0715) (0.0668) (0.0791)
0.01 0.16 -0.53 0.26
First-Stage F-score 112.78 62.693 57.242 138.19 82.427 89.658
Observations 173 169 162 169 167 161
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Geography No No Geography
Table Notes
Appendix Table 7: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands, Ethnic Inequality, and 
Contemporary Development. 2SLS Estimates
Panel B: Excluding Capitals
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
Panel C: Excluding Small Groups
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
Panel A: All Ethnic Homelands
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geographic 
Endowments (PC)
The table reports cross-country two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimates, associating contemporary inequality in lights per capita 
across ethnic homelands with inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands in the first stage and the component of 
ethnic inequality explained by inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands with economic development in the 
second stage. The dependent variable in the second stage is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The dependent variable in the 
first stage is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic-linguistic homelands in 2000, using 
the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue (in columns (4)-(6)).  In Panel A we use 
all ethnic-linguistic homelands. In Panel B we exclude ethnic-linguistic regions where capital cities fall. In Panel C we exclude ethnic-
linguisic regions where small ethnicities consisting less than one percent of a country’s population reside.
The main independent variable in the first stage is a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic 
homelands, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) (in columns (1)-(3)) and Ethnologue (in columns (4)-(6)). 
The index is the first principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, land 
suitability for agriculture, and area under water. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) we control for the overall degree of spatial inequality 
in geographic endowments using a composite index that aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients on distance to the 
coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, water area across Thiessen polygons that use as input points the centroids of the 
linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue dataset.  In columns (3) and (6) we also control for the mean value of distance to 
the coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water. 
All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All 
Homelands
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. Small 
Groups
All 
Homelands
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. Small 
Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contemporary Ethnic Inequality -1.4885*** -1.3292*** -1.6339*** -1.2844*** -1.5078*** -1.2004** 
(0.4017) (0.3833) (0.5041) (0.3620) (0.4006) (0.4696)
-3.71 -3.47 -3.24 -3.55 -3.76 -2.56
0.0038 0.0131 -0.0832 0.0462 0.1284 -0.066
(0.0617) (0.0561) (0.0525) (0.0680) (0.0841) (0.0582)
0.06 0.23 -1.59 0.68 1.53 -1.13
adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.663 0.652 0.678 0.641
Observations 173 151 173 168 144 169
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary economic development with contemporary ethnic inequality 
and inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. 
In columns (1) and (4) we construct the ethnic inequality measures and the inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic 
homelands (Gini coefficients) using all ethnic-linguistic homelands. In columns (2) and (5) we exclude ethnic-linguistic regions where 
capital cities fall. In columns (3) and (6) we exclude ethnic-linguistic regions where small ethnicities consisting less than one percent of 
a country’s population reside. The main independent variables are and index capturing contemporary differences in development (as 
reflected in lights per capita in 2000) across ethnic homelands and a composite index capturing inequality in geographic endowments 
across ethnic homelands. The index is the first principal component of inequality across ethnic-linguistic homelands in distance to the 
coast, elevation, land suitability for agriculture, and area under water. In columns (1)-(3) we use the digitized version of Atlas Narodov 
Mira (GREG) and in columns (4)-(6) we are using the Ethnologue maps. All specifications include continental fixed effects (constants 
not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 8: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands, Ethnic Inequality, and 
Contemporary Development. OLS Estimates
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Inequality in Geographic Endowments 
across Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Theil Index - Overall 1
Theil Index - Between 0.9077* 1
Theil Index - Within 0.5687* 0.1710* 1
Mean Log Deviation - Overall 0.9893* 0.8951* 0.5683* 1
Mean Log Deviation - Between 0.8985* 0.9863* 0.1762* 0.9072* 1
Mean Log Deviation - Within 0.5568* 0.1637* 0.9864* 0.5649* 0.1653* 1
Living Conditions Index -0.2169* -0.2095* -0.0986* -0.1603* -0.1518* -0.0781* 1.0000
Education -0.0114 -0.0308 0.0336 0.0196 0.0019 0.0422 0.3983*
Sewage System -0.0230 -0.0302 0.0053 -0.0076 -0.0158 0.0132 0.1696* 0.3944* 1.0000
Clean Piped Water -0.0098 -0.0133 0.0031 0.0039 -0.0020 0.0130 0.1319* 0.2747* 0.5517* 1
Access to Electricity Grid -0.0231 -0.0429 0.0299 0.0010 -0.0153 0.0324 0.2331* 0.4803* 0.5185* 0.5280* 1
Appendix Table 9: Correlation Structure Afrobarometer Data at the District Level
Ethnic Inequality Indicators Development Proxy Measures
The table reports the correlation structure between the main variables employed in the cross-region analysis within African countries (Afrobarometer Sample). The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. * indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
